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I.

Introduction and Executive Summary

“The grand plan was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of property
every time its regulations impinged too severely on a property right—limiting the possible uses for
a parcel of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory red tape. If the government
labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say the least, much less regulation. ”
Charles Fried, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991).
“It is one of the happy accidents of our federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. ”
Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
This report examines the experiences of two states, Florida and Oregon, with so-called
takings “compensation” measures. The goal of the report is to identify the lessons from these
states that might be useful to citizens and policy makers in other jurisdictions considering similar
measures.
For the last twenty years there has been a nationwide debate about whether government
should be required to pay property owners to comply with land use and environmental rules, above
and beyond the protection for property owners provided by the U.S. and state constitutions.
Property rights advocates have argued that requiring the public to pay to enforce regulatory
requirements would improve the fairness of regulatory programs and force government officials to
make more judicious and discriminating decisions about the regulations they adopt and enforce.1
Opponents have argued that such a compensation mandate would undermine the public’s ability to
implement community protections and impose unfair financial burdens on taxpayers.2
At least so far, the U.S. Congress has rejected takings compensation proposals.3 The
majority of states have rejected these proposals as well, although many states have adopted more
limited forms of private property rights legislation.4 However, half a dozen states have adopted
1

E.g., E. Donald Elliott, How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental Regulation, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1997).
2
E.g., Glenn Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People, And The Environment, 8
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 521, 567-80 (1997).
3
See Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, Regulatory Takings Legislation, at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/regulatory
_takings/takings_legis.cfm (collecting failed property rights proposals in Congress).
4
See Harvey M. Jacobs, STATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS; THE IMPACTS OF THOSE LAWS ON MY
LAND (Lincoln Institute 1999); John D. Echeverria, REFLECTIONS ON MEASURE 7, 1000 FRIENDS OF
OREGON MCCALL SPEAKERS PROGRAM (May 31, 2001), at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/documents/RT_Pubs_Speeches_Reflections
OrMeas7.pdf.
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legislation that explicitly requires the government to pay property owners subject to regulatory
restrictions when the restrictions do not amount to “takings ” under the federal or state
constitutions.
This report focuses on Florida and Oregon because these states have adopted the broadest
and, at least from the perspective of property rights advocates, the most successful measures. In
1995, Florida adopted legislation that includes two separate but related measures, the Bert J. Harris
Private Property Rights Act and the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act.
In 2004, Oregon voters adopted Measure 37, and three years later adopted Measure 49, which
partly reversed Measure 37. The report also discusses, in more summary fashion, the
consequences of takings compensation legislation in the several other states that have embraced this
legislative agenda, including Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
These state measures provide an opportunity to examine the consequences of adopting the
property rights agenda. The states are serving as laboratories, to use Justice Brandeis’s apt phrase,
producing potentially valuable information for other jurisdictions grappling with the takings issue.
In particular, Californians will have an opportunity to vote on two competing property rights
proposals in June 2008, one of which, Proposition 98, arguably would require the government to
pay to enforce land use and environmental laws.5 Other states or the U.S. Congress may also
debate the takings issue in the future.
While the experiences with the takings agenda in Florida and Oregon (as well as the other
states) vary in important respects, our analysis leads to five overarching conclusions:
The Takings Agenda Undermines Community Protections. The virtually invariable effect of
takings legislation, to the extent it has been effective, has been to force state and local governments
to not adopt laws and regulations they otherwise would have adopted and to not enforce restrictions
already on the books. Despite their label as “compensation” measures, this legislation has only
very rarely resulted in actual payments to property owners. Nor has takings legislation resulted in
more discriminating or judicious use of regulatory authority. Instead, these measures have
essentially blocked the enactment of any significant new community protections and severely
undermined the protections that pre-dated the measures.
Special Interests Benefit the Most from the Takings Agenda. While the property rights
agenda is generally advertised as being for and on behalf of the “little guy,” the primary
beneficiaries of the property rights agenda have been relatively well to do special interests. In
Oregon, the primary beneficiaries of Measure 37 have been timber companies seeking the
5

California Center for Environmental Law & Policy, CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 98 & 99: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Berkeley May 2008), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/envirolaw/Prop_98-99_Analysis-1.pdf; Shute, Mihaly &
Weinberger Letter to Susan Smartt, California League of Conservation Voters Education Fund
(Dec. 6, 2007), available at www.ecovote.org/no98yes99/smw-letter-re-jarvis.pdf.

2

opportunity to subdivide and sell off their resource lands and/or wishing to avoid new restrictions
on timber harvesting practices. In Florida, the primary beneficiaries of property rights legislation
have been real estate developers and corporate land owners. Developers and owners of vacant,
developable land have benefited at the expense of the rest of society, including homeowners whose
community protections have been undermined.
The Takings Agenda Generates Land Use Conflicts. The property rights agenda has
fostered additional land use controversy, generating litigation and other legal claims and creating
conflicts between neighboring land owners. The conflicts generated by the Florida property rights
legislation have been particularly intense in urban areas and in the urbanizing fringe, while the
Oregon property rights legislation has primarily produced land use conflicts in rural agricultural
and forest lands.
The Takings Agenda Confers Special Windfalls. Takings measures have conferred
windfalls—either in the form of actual payments or, far more frequently, legal exemptions from
regulations—by permitting certain land owners to evade the responsibilities that apply to the rest of
the community. Economics research demonstrates that comprehensive land use regulatory
programs have little if any net adverse effect on property values. Thus, takings “compensation ”
awards, far from providing a remedy for significant regulatory burdens, generally provide claimants
windfalls based on the inflated value of special exemptions from the rules and regulations that apply
to everybody else.
The Takings Agenda Undermines Local Democracy. Finally, the property rights agenda
has undermined democratic government, especially at the local level. The property rights measures
have very seriously impaired communities’ capacity to enact new land use laws and limited the
opportunities for members of the public to advocate for and defend their communities.
This report is organized as follows. The next section describes in detail Florida’s 1995
property rights legislation, discusses how the legislation altered the balance of power in the state
between developers and other large land owners and the general public, and addresses Florida’s
Hometown Democracy movement, the grassroots response to the success of the property rights
movement in Florida. The following section describes in detail Oregon’s Measure 37, the torrent
of legal claims against the state and local governments produced by this measure, and the
consequences for Oregon’s comprehensive land use program. It concludes with a discussion of
recently adopted Oregon Measure 49 and its significance. The final section discusses in some
detail the five major lessons, set forth above, that we have drawn from this study.
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II.

Florida Property Rights Legislation

Introduction
On May 18, 1995, the State of Florida adopted what is arguably the most far-reaching
property rights legislation in the country.6 The legislation has two separate, but closely related
parts. The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act created a judicially enforceable
right to financial compensation based on “burdensome” regulatory restrictions on the use of real
property. 7 The Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act created a mediation
process designed to permit land owners to obtain relief from allegedly “unfair ” or
“unreasonable” restrictions. 8
Florida adopted takings legislation against the backdrop of the state’s comprehensive land
use regulatory program. Adopted in the 1970s and 80s in response to public concerns about the
social and environmental impacts of rapid development,9 Florida’s primary land use laws include
the Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972,10 the Florida Environmental Land and
Water Management Act of 1973,11 and the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development and Regulation Act of 1985.12 Together, these statutes require the state to adopt and
maintain a State Comprehensive Plan establishing goals and policies to guide Florida’s growth,
require local governments to adopt comprehensive plans and implementing regulations, and provide
for state and regional oversight of growth management policies across the state.13 Subsequent
enactments strengthened Florida’s land use system by directing development away from barrier
islands and other high-hazard coastal areas, creating incentives to promote more compact urban
development patterns, and requiring concurrency between new development authorized by local
governments and local infrastructure capacity.14 While the Florida property rights legislation did
not formally amend this legislation, it has drastically altered its effectiveness.
One hallmark of the Florida land use program has been extensive opportunities for public
involvement. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation
Act declares that “It is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive
planning process to the fullest extent possible. ” 15 Members of the public have broad rights to
6

1995 FLA. LAWS CH. 95-181 (C.S.H.B. 863) (codified at FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001 and § 70.51).
Oregon Measure 37 was even more far reaching before it was amended by Measure 49.
7
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001.
8
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51.
9
David J. Russ, How the “Property Rights” Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 410-12 (1994).
10
FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 186.001-186.031, 186.801-186.901.
11
FLA. ST. ANN. § 380.012, et seq.
12
FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3161, et seq.
13
FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3167(2), 163.3194, 163.3202.
14
FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3178, 163.3180, 163.2511-163.2526.
15
FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3181(1).

initiate and intervene in local proceedings involving comprehensive plans,16 as well as more limited
standing to challenge approvals of particular development projects in court.17 Again, the property
rights legislation significantly changed the role of the public in the land use process.
The Florida takings legislation was adopted at the height of the private property rights
movement, both nationally and in Florida.18 The debate over takings in Florida consumed several
years and featured a gubernatorial study commission on the topic, a proposed state constitutional
amendment, and numerous competing legislative proposals.19 Major corporate property owners
were the driving force behind the push for legislation, although they succeeded in enlisting
numerous ideological allies and building a populist base of support.20 By 1995, following a shift in
control of the legislature to the Republican Party, a political consensus emerged that some type of
property rights legislation was inevitable. The final legislation emerged from a bi-partisan
negotiation process organized by Governor Lawton Chiles, a Democrat.21
The basic objective of the Bert Harris Act is clear: to expand upon the protections provided
to property owners by the Takings Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions. The
Bert Harris Act begins by stating
The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and
political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private
16

FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 163.3184(9)-(10) (authorizing formal initiation of or intervention in
administrative hearings on comprehensive plan amendments); FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3181 (same).
See also FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(4) (stating that local administrative proceedings “must provide
an opportunity for participation in the process by an aggrieved or adversely affected party, allowing
a reasonable time for the party to prepare and present a case for the quasi-judicial hearing”).
17
FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(3) ( “Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de
novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any
decision of such local government granting or denying an application for, or to prevent such local
government from taking any action on, a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which
materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not
consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. ”); FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3215(4)
(providing that parties may challenge decisions by “an appeal filed by a petition for writ of
certiorari filed in circuit court ”). See also Board of County Com’rs of Brevard County v. Snyder,
627 So.2d 469, 474-76 (Fla. 1993) (establishing that some land use decisions are “quasi-judicial”
and thus “subject to review by certiorari ” and “will be upheld only if they are supported by
substantial competent evidence”).
18
See Robert Meltz, Federal Regulation of the Environment and the Taking Issue, 37 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 95 (Feb. 1990).
19
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida’s Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Results in Mixed
Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 327-333 (1995).
20
Id. at 329 n. 65 (observing that St. Joe Paper Company, U.S. Sugar Corporation, Lykes
Brothers, Collier Enterprises, and A. Duda & Sons “were among the most powerful corporate
sponsors of the property rights movement in 1994” ).
21
Id. at 318 ( “The Act, although passed on the next to the last day of the session, represented a
compromise painstakingly crafted over weeks of intense negotiations among an ad hoc group of
Senators and Representatives who were longtime property rights activists, key executives
representing land use agencies, lobbyists for developers and small and large agricultural interests,
environmentalists, and state and local governments.”).

5

property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United
States Constitution. The Legislature determines that there is an important state interest in
protecting the interests of private property owners from such inordinate burdens.22
It is less clear what the Act’s proponents thought the consequences of this new policy
would be. Governor Chiles predicted that Florida’s regulatory programs would remain largely
intact: “[W]e can be proud of this legislation. It safeguards our environmental and growthmanagement protections while also offering private property owners a means to seek compensation
for devalued land. ” 23 Other close observers predicted that the law would not result in “an
explosion of litigation or a rash of damage awards ” but rather would “produce a sense of caution ”
among government officials.24
The goal of the Dispute Resolution Act was to reduce the stringency and increase the
flexibility of regulatory controls by providing land owners an additional opportunity, once the
normal land use regulatory review process was complete, to seek relief from “unreasonable” or
“unfair ” regulations. In contrast to the Bert Harris Act, the primary purpose of which was to
create new substantive protection for private property rights, the Dispute Resolution Act granted
property owners new procedural rights to object to and obtain relief from regulations.
The Florida Property Rights Laws
This section provides a sketch and analysis of the primary provisions of the Bert Harris Act
and the Dispute Resolution Act as a prelude to a more extensive discussion of the consequences of
the adoption of these measures, especially the Bert Harris Act.
The Bert Harris Act. The Bert Harris Act creates a right of action to recover financial
compensation or other relief when a regulatory decision or other government action “inordinately
burden[s] an existing use of real property. ” 25 Importantly, and confusingly, the term “existing
use” does not have its ordinary meaning, because it encompasses not only actual existing uses but
also certain future uses. Specifically, the Act defines a proposed future use to be an existing use for
the purposes of the Act if five conditions are met: the use (1) is “reasonably foreseeable,” (2) is
“non-speculative,” (3) is “suitable for the subject real property,” (4) is “compatible with adjacent

22

FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(1).
Roy Hunt, Property Rights and Wrongs: Historic Preservation and Florida’s 1995 Private
Property Rights Protection Act, 48 FLA. L. REV. 709, 715 (1996). See also Ron Weaver, Bert
Harris Update (1997) ( “Wetlands, woodpeckers, scrubjays, and the like should be protected
generally, but owners need no longer bear disproportionate shares of the burden of that
protection. ”).
24
David L. Powell, Robert M. Rhodes, & Dan R. Stengle, A Measured Step to Protect Private
Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 296 (1995).
25
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(2).
23
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land uses,” and (5) creates “an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair
market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property. ” 26
While this definition appears to be limiting, the Act actually applies quite broadly to
regulations affecting future land uses. Many of the conditions listed above are ambiguous and do
not establish clear restrictions on the kinds of potential future uses covered by the Act. The
requirement that a proposed use be “compatible with adjacent land uses ” is potentially the most
significant, because it arguably excludes major development projects in undeveloped rural areas.
But assuming this is correct, an “existing use” still arguably includes virtually any potentially
profitable development opportunity in Florida’s urban centers or in the urbanizing fringe.
The other key term in the Act— “inordinate burden”—is defined as a government action
that has directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that [1] the property
owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectations for the
existing [i.e., or proposed] use of the real property or [2] the property owner is left with
existing [i.e., or proposed] uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which
in fairness should be borne by the public at large.27
This provision creates two alternative paths for demonstrating the existence of an inordinate
burden. First, the claimant can attempt to show that her development plans are based upon a
“reasonable, investment-backed expectation” for use of the property and that the regulation bars
her from “attaining” this expectation. Second, an owner can attempt to show that the restriction is
“unreasonable” in the sense that the owner is left with such limited uses of the property that she
has been forced to bear a burden that “in fairness should be borne by the public at large. ”
The inordinate burden standard is clearly far more expansive than the constitutional takings
standard,28 and indeed goes beyond any reading of the federal Takings Clause ever offered by any
justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Generally speaking, a regulatory taking occurs only in

26

FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(b).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e).
28
Commentators have offered different views on how far the inordinate burden standard diverges
from constitutional doctrine. Some contend that it represents only a “cautious and modest ”
expansion of constitutional takings doctrine, which is “not intended to drastically affect Florida’s
growth management or environmental laws. ” Richard Grosso & Robert Hartsell, Old McDonald
Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Property Rights After the Veto of S.B. 1712, FLA. BAR. J. (Mar.
2005). Others contend that the inordinate takings standard has more bite. As one commentary
observed, “You can make the argument that Florida’s legislature wouldn’t have gone to so much
trouble if all they meant to do was to make it a little easier for land owners to gain compensation. ”
Charles C. Carter & John Taylor, Current Status of Property Rights Compensation States, 33 REAL
ESTATE L. J. 405, 411 (2005). See also Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Private Property
Rights Protection Act: Does it Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 697706 (1996) (offering a highly critical appraisal of the Bert Harris Act).
27
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Arizona
In November 2006, Arizona voters approved, by a margin of 65% to 35%, Proposition 207,
or the Private Property Rights Protection Act.a The Act includes a pay or waive provision closely
modeled after Oregon Measure 37,b and another provision, responding to the Supreme Court
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,c restricting the use of eminent domain for economic
development.d The yes campaign spent $1.8 million, most of it contributed by Americans for
Limited Government, “a group led by New York real estate mogul Howard Rich,” e in comparison
to the opponents’ relatively paltry budget of $420,000.f
While the drafters of the Arizona proposition used Measure 37 as their starting point, there
are several important differences. Most significantly, whereas Measure 37 had broad retroactive
effect, the Arizona proposition only applies to laws adopted following its enactment.g The drafters
of the Arizona proposition also tinkered with the Measure 37 exemptions, for example, by
exempting regulations restricting the use of property for “housing of sex offenders, selling illegal
drugs, liquor control, or pornography [or] obscenity,” and (somewhat ambiguously) laws that that
“[d]o not directly regulate an owner’s land. ” h In addition, the Arizona proposition avoided some
of the drafting problems with Measure 37 by making clear that waivers are transferablei and that the
government entity that enacts a law (as opposed to enforces it) would be liable to pay
compensation.j
Arizona’s takings proposition already has had dramatic effects, in particular on the State’s
historic preservation efforts. The City of Flagstaff is the target of the first lawsuit under the Private
Property Rights Protection Act, brought by several land owners objecting to the creation of an
overlay district in the City’s most historic neighborhood.k The plaintiffs demanded $368,000 in
compensation.l One historic preservation advocate objected to the owners’ proposals to tear down
small historic buildings and build larger modern structures, stating: “We’re trying to stop this from
happening anymore. It’s not what we wanted to live around when we bought here. ” m
Tuscon may not be far behind. A developer of “minidorms ” near the University of
Arizona has threatened to sue the city for $12.6 million based on a “regulation passed by the City
Council . . . [that] requires a historic study be done on any 45-year-old or older building in
Tucson’s historic core . . . before it can be torn down” and allows the City up to six months
following the study to determine if “it wants to buy the property or find a private buyer. ” n The
lawyer representing the developer was quoted in the local press as stating that he “hope[d] to
trigger a flood of Proposition 207 claims from other property owners by printing easy to use fill-inAZ. REV. ST. §§ 12-1131-38; Daniel Kraker, Growth Unfettered, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
November 26, 2007; Front, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 2007.
b
AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134.
c
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
d
AZ. REV. ST. §§ 12-1131, 1133, 1136.
e
Amanda J. Crawford, After Smoke Cleared, A look at Finances, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Dec. 24,
2006.
f
Id.
g
AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(B)(7).
h
AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(B).
i
AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(F).
j
AZ. REV. ST. § 12-1134(A).
k
Kraker, Growth Unfettered.
l
Id.; J. Ferguson, Property rights test case filed, ARIZONA DAILY SUN, June 29, 2007.
m
Kraker, Growth Unfettered.
n
Rob O’Dell, Minidorm developer threatens $12M suit, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Sept. 15, 2007.
a
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the-blank claim forms. ” o Another developer said the City’s total liability could reach $500 million.p
Similarly, in Pinal County, a developer has threatened a half-million dollar lawsuit based on the
reversion of the zoning on a property to farm use after the owner failed to proceed in timely fashion
with an authorized development projectq
In addition, the proposition has already had a chilling effect in several communities. The
threat of a $40 million dollar lawsuit reportedly led the City of Phoenix to repeal a historic district it
established in 2007.r Mayor Phil Golden was quoted as saying that the repeal occurred “on the
advice of attorneys,” and that he had “a fiduciary duty to the citizens not to risk $40 million. ” s
One resident concluded: “The ability to establish new historic districts . . . is nearly impossible
because of Proposition 207. ” t In Tempe, citizens withdrew an application for the establishment of
a historic district after opponents threatened to sue under Proposition 207 and it appeared likely that
the City would reject the application based on this threat.u In Tucson, the proposition may thwart
efforts to promote in-fill development through adoption of a “neighborhood preservation zoning
overlay” plan.v Colette Altaffer, president of the Catalina Vista Neighborhood Association and a
founder of the Neighborhood Infill Coalition, said that “Proposition 207 has rendered us toothless,
unfortunately. It locked us into where we were with an existing code. You can’t tighten it without
facing a challenge, and you’re really reluctant to loosen it. ” w
According to another observer, while “on the surface” Proposition 207 “sounds fair
enough, . . . it creates a nightmare because it mainly vests real estate entrepreneurs with the ability to
circumvent the will of the majority of residents in any given neighborhood. ” x

Id.
Id.
q
Lynh Bui, Property Rights Suit Threatened, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 2008.
r
Minidorm issue may trigger necessary lawsuits, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Aug. 8, 2007; Laurie
Roberts, Developer Takes on City Hall and Wins, Thanks to Prop. 207, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr.
14, 2007.
s
Id.
t
Diana Balazs, Prop. 207 Hampers Municipalities, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 2007.
u
Garin Groff, Tempe neighborhood’s historical status on hold: City’s oldest area looks at new
way to achieve designation, TRIBUNE, Sept. 7, 2007; Handling history: Memories shouldn’t erode
private-property rights, TRIBUNE, Aug. 22, 2007.
v
Tom Beal, Pilot plans disappoint Midtown neighbors, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Jan. 27, 2008.
w
Id.
x
Minidorm issue may trigger necessary lawsuits, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Aug. 8, 2007.
o
p
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“extreme circumstances ” 29 when a regulation is so burdensome that it is the “functional
equivalent ” of a physical occupation or an outright condemnation.30 Outside of the narrow per se
category of “total ” takings,31 regulatory takings claims are generally evaluated using an ad hoc
analysis focusing on the economic impact of the government action, the degree to which it interferes
with the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action.32 This analysis may encompass various considerations but typically addresses, in addition
to economic impact, whether the claimant was aware of the regulation when he purchased the
property or could have reasonably anticipated its adoption, the degree to which the regulation
singles out an owner for special treatment or is comprehensive in nature, and whether the regulation
is designed to prevent activities that the legislature has determined are harmful to the public
welfare.33
By contrast, under the inordinate burden standard, and focusing on the more expansive part
of the definition, an owner is entitled to compensation if a regulation permanently bars her from
“attaining ” her “reasonable, investment-backed expectations. ” Under this test, the economic
burden imposed by a regulation (if any), the relative comprehensiveness of the regulation, or the
potential harmfulness of the proposed development, all become irrelevant. Any developer who has
purchased property in an urban or urbanizing area with a plan to develop it can make a strong claim
that the imposition of virtually any new regulatory constraint represents a compensable action.34
This takings standard plainly hamstrings the ability of state and local governments to respond to
challenges posed by new scientific information, changed circumstances, or evolving social values.
While the “investment-backed expectations ” language is borrowed from constitutional
takings doctrine, the Act says that the courts are free to disregard how this language has been
interpreted in that context.35 Thus, this term could take on a new and different meaning in Florida’s

29

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
31
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
32
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-539.
33
John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 17899 (2005).
34
The second path for establishing an inordinate burden effectively converts the so-called
Armstrong principle—the U.S. Supreme Court’s often-quoted statement that the Takings Clause is
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”—into a freestanding takings test.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). While the Armstrong principle is a central
element of modern takings doctrine, the Supreme Court has never suggested that it can serve as a
determinative test for deciding when compensation is due. It is hard to say how, if at all, this
takings test would diverge from the traditional constitutional takings test.
35
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(9) (stating that the Act’s terms “may not necessarily be construed
under the case law regarding takings if the government action does not rise to the level of a
taking ”).
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statutory takings regime, lending further support to the conclusion that the inordinate burden
standard diverges significantly from the constitutional takings test.
The Bert Harris Act, unlike Oregon’s Measure 37, is purely prospective, that is, it only
applies to restrictions adopted after May 11, 1995. 36 This represents a significant limitation on the
scope of the law. The Act also includes several other exemptions, including for “temporary”
limitations on real property use (e.g., development moratoria), impacts to private property resulting
from government efforts to abate or otherwise address a “public nuisance” or a “noxious use of
private property,” as well as government actions “taken to grant relief ” to a developer or other
property owner under the Act (i.e., neighbors cannot assert a claim under the Act on the ground that
they have been harmed by relief granted to a claimant objecting to regulations as too
burdensome).37
To initiate a proceeding, a land owner must submit a “claim ” along with a “bona fide, valid
appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real
property. ” 38 The government must provide written notice of the claim to members of the public
who were “parties ” to the underlying administrative proceeding, to owners of contiguous
properties, and to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs.39 Within 180 days of receipt of the
claim (90 days in the case of agricultural lands), the government must respond with a “written
settlement offer. ” 40 The “offer ” can run the gamut from complete rejection of the claim, to
modification of the regulatory action, to purchase of the property, to new conditions or mitigation
measures.
If a settlement is reached and the government agrees to modify its decision, “the relief
granted shall protect the public interest served by the regulations at issue and be the appropriate
relief necessary to prevent the government regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the
property. ” 41 If the settlement “would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute as
it would otherwise apply to the subject real property,” the parties must obtain Circuit Court
approval of the settlement agreement.42
36

FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(12). See also id. (stating that an amendment to a pre-existing restriction
“gives rise to a cause of action . . . only to the extent that the application of the amendatory
language imposes an inordinate burden apart from the law, rule, regulation, or ordinance being
amended ” and that the Act does not apply to any rule, regulation, or ordinance “formally noticed
for adoption” prior to the Act’s effective date).
37
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e). In addition, the Act excludes claims based on government
transportation facilities, state, regional, or local actions under delegated federal authority, and
repetitive claims for loss in value to the same property. FLA. ST. ANN. §§ 70.001(10), (3)(c), (9).
38
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(a).
39
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(b).
40
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(4)(c).
41
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(11)(d).
42
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(11)(d).
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If the parties fail to reach agreement, the government must issue a “ripeness decision”
specifying what property uses it will allow.43 Upon issuance of this decision (or if the government
fails to issue a decision), the land owner can sue in Circuit Court for compensation or other relief.44
If the court determines that the government action imposed an inordinate burden it must impanel a
jury to fix appropriate compensation.45 The Act provides that the jury’s compensation award
shall be determined by calculating the difference in the fair market value of the real property,
as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner had the
ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed expectation or was not left with uses that
are unreasonable, whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of the real property,
as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue, as inordinately burdened,
considering the settlement offer together with the ripeness decision, of the governmental
entity or entities.46
Given the Act’s unique, two-part definition of “inordinate burden,” it is ambiguous how
compensation is supposed to be calculated; in particular, it is debatable whether the level of
compensation should differ depending on whether the claimant bases his claim on the alleged
frustration of investment expectations or the alleged unreasonableness of his remaining uses.
To encourage settlement, the Act provides that a claimant who prevails in court may recover
his reasonable attorneys fees and costs from the government, if the court determines that “the
settlement offer, including the ripeness decision, of the governmental entity did not constitute a bona
fide offer to the property owner which reasonably would have resolved the claim. ” 47 On the other
hand, a prevailing government defendant is also entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs from
the property owner if the court determines that the owner declined a reasonable settlement offer.48
The final provision of the Bert Harris Act states, somewhat surprisingly, “This section does
not affect the sovereign immunity of government. ” 49 On its face, this provision appears to bar
claims for monetary relief from government, undercutting the purpose of the Act to create a new
monetary remedy against government. While the meaning of this provision is grist for continuing
debate, the Florida Third District Court of Appeals ruled that it should not be read to prohibit an
award of monetary compensation.50
Nothing in the Bert Harris Act explicitly speaks to the rights of the public to participate in
proceedings under the Act.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(5)(a).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(5)(b).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(b).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(b).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(c).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(6)(c).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.001(13).
Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 863 So.2d 320 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003).

The Dispute Resolution Act. The Dispute Resolution Act, which was adopted at the same
time as the Bert Harris Act, grants regulated land owners a special opportunity to seek regulatory
relief. Although the Act does not directly limit government authority or explicitly grant land owners
new substantive rights, the Act puts a powerful thumb on the scales of public decision-making in
favor of property owners. Unlike the Bert Harris Act, which only applies prospectively, the Dispute
Resolution Act applies regardless of when the regulation was adopted.
A property owner who believes that a regulation “is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the
use of the owner’s real property” may initiate a proceeding under the Act by “fil[ing] a request for
relief ” with the government.51 The Act does not define the terms “unreasonable” or “unfair,”
though it seems clear, given the purpose of the Act to provide additional relief to regulated property
owners, that they are not supposed to be equated with the constitutional takings test. The
government is required to forward the request for relief to a special magistrate who is mutually
acceptable to the government and the property owner.52
The government also must provide a copy of the request for relief to contiguous property
owners and to “[a]ny substantially affected party” who substantively participated in the underlying
administrative proceeding.53 These persons may request permission to participate in the
proceeding, but participation “is limited to addressing issues raised regarding alternatives,
variances, or other types of adjustment to the development order or enforcement action which may
impact their substantial interests. ” 54 Moreover, the Act indicates that members of the public “shall
not be granted party or intervenor status. ” 55
The magistrate must hold a hearing on the request for relief, which must be “informal and
open to the public. ” 56 The Act emphasizes that “[t]he object of the hearing is to focus attention on
the impact of the governmental action giving rise to the request for relief,” and to “explore
alternatives” in terms of granting regulatory relief.57 The magistrate’s primary responsibility is “to
facilitate a resolution of the conflict ” that addresses the claimant’s concerns and reduces regulatory
burdens. 58
Following the hearing, the magistrate must prepare a written recommendation based on her
findings, including any recommendations that the government “reduce[] restraints on the use of the
owner’s real property. ” 59 The Act, unlike the Bert Harris Act, contains no provision addressing
51
52
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FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(4).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(4).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(5).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(12).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(12).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(17).
FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(17).
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potential conflicts between the outcome of the mediation process and established laws and
regulations.
The government must respond to the magistrate’s recommendation by accepting, modifying,
or rejecting it.60 If the land owner and government agree on how to modify the restrictions, the
government will proceed to implement the solution through the normal land use process. The Act
states that a magistrate’s recommendation is not sufficient, by itself, to amend a community’s
comprehensive plan, but the recommendation will be treated as “data in support of ” such an
amendment.61 Comprehensive plan amendments necessary to implement a magistrate’s
recommendation are exempt from the normal twice-a-year limit on plan amendments imposed by
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act.62
If the government rejects the magistrate’s recommendations, or the parties are otherwise
unable to agree, the government must issue “a written decision . . . that describes as specifically as
possible the use or uses available to the subject real property. ” 63 In other words, even if the parties
fail to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, the government must record whether the mediation
process has led the government to change its position. The magistrate’s findings also “may serve
as an indication of sufficient hardship to support modification, variances, or special exemptions, ” 64
meaning that a magistrate’s recommendation may provide the legal basis for challenging the
government’s failure to grant regulatory relief. This threat is obviously designed to encourage the
government to accept the magistrate’s recommendations and authorize development.
The Consequences of the Florida Property Rights Legislation
Our basic conclusion is that the Florida property rights legislation, and the Bert Harris Act
in particular, has significantly altered the balance of power between developers and the public and
made it virtually impossible for government to adopt and enforce new land use or environmental
regulations. This conclusion closely tracks the findings of the only other recent, systematic
assessment of the effects of the Florida property rights legislation, published in 2005, which
concluded, among other things, that the Bert Harris Act has “tipp[ed] the balance in favor of land
owners by freezing government regulatory activity after the date of the Act’s inception,”
“fundamentally restricted [the ability of planners and attorneys] to do the[ir] job[s],” and created a
general “regulatory chill ” in the state.65 Even the eponymous sponsor of the Bert Harris Act has
some reservations about the legislation; in a 2006 interview, Bert J. Harris, Jr. was quoted as stating
60

FLA. ST. ANN. § 70.51(21).
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that “although the bill was designed to prevent government from indiscriminately engaging in
actions just short of a ‘taking’ of a land owner’s property, he never envisioned it as a development
shelter. ” 66
Claims Data. According to records maintained by the Florida Department of Legal Affairs,
as of February 2008, property owners had filed 202 Bert Harris Act claims with state, regional, and
local governments, and property owners had filed 76 claims under the Dispute Resolution Act.
Some indeterminate fraction of the Bert Harris Act claims subsequently evolved into full-blown
litigation. It is doubtful that these data are completely accurate,67 but the Department’s figures
represent the best information available.
The number of claims filed in Florida over the past 13 years is significantly smaller than the
number of claims filed under Oregon Measure 37 during the three years that that legislation was in
effect. This disparity in numbers is mostly due to the fact that the Bert Harris Act, the more potent
of the two parts of the Florida legislation, applies only prospectively; the vast majority of the
thousands of claims filed under Measure 37 were based on regulations enacted prior to the
measure’s adoption. In addition, the smaller number of claims under the Bert Harris Act may be
due to the fact that claimants must submit a “bona fide, valid appraisal ” along with their requests
for relief; the courts have said that failure to satisfy this condition mandates rejection of a claim.68
Measure 37 included no similar requirement.
More importantly, however, the number of claims and lawsuits filed in Florida provides only
limited insight into the impact of the property rights legislation. As discussed below, some
communities have decided against adopting new regulations because of the prospect of claims, and
other communities have withdrawn or relaxed regulations in the face of threats that Bert Harris Act
claims would be filed. These impacts appear to be by far the most significant consequence of the
Bert Harris Act.
Litigation Activity. Developers have filed a sufficient number of successful lawsuits under
the Act to confirm the expansiveness of the inordinate burden test. Several developers have
succeeded in obtaining financial recoveries under the Act, albeit typically through a settlement after
filing a lawsuit demanding compensation. In Aquaport, L.C. v. Collier County, following the
developer’s filing of an application with Collier County to construct a 10-story, 68-unit hotel, the
County amended its development code to limit density, forcing the developer to build a smaller 15unit condominium. The Circuit Court ruled that the amendment constituted an inordinate burden,
66

Mitchell Pellachia, Bert J. Harris Act Looms over Alaska Parcel Concessions, MIAMI SUN POST,
July 21, 2006.
67
For example, Hillsborough County has had a total of 23 Dispute Resolution Act cases, but the
state database indicates the County has had only 7 cases. Interview with Paula Harvey, Director,
Hillsborough County Planning & Zoning Division, in Tampa, Florida, Feb. 20, 2008.
68
See, e.g., Osceola County v. Best Diversified, Inc, 936 So.2d 55 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006).
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and the County settled the case by paying the developer $2.75 million.69 In another case, the City
of Miami Beach reportedly settled a Bert Harris Act claim based on a reduced floor area restriction
by purchasing the property, which was adjacent to city hall, for municipal use.70 Significantly,
apparently no Florida court, at any level, has rejected a claim under the Act on the ground that the
regulation was not sufficiently burdensome to rise to the level of an inordinate burden.
Despite these litigation successes, there has been, as one commentary observes, an
“unanticipated dearth of litigation” under the Act.71 All told, the Bert Harris Act has probably
generated fewer than several dozen lawsuits since its adoption. Even more remarkable, the appellate
courts have issued almost no decisions providing guidance on how to interpret the Act. The Florida
Supreme Court has declined every opportunity to hear a case involving a Bert Harris Act claim,72
and the Courts of Appeals have issued only a handful of reported decisions. As to the inordinate
burden standard, the Fifth District Court of Appeals has observed that the Bert Harris Act “creates
a separate and distinct cause of action for property owners where governmental regulation has
‘inordinately burdened’ the property, but does not amount to a ‘taking’ under the Florida or federal
constitutions. ” 73 In that case the Court affirmed rejection of a claim based on Marion County’s
refusal to extend the term of a permit authorizing operation of a waste disposal facility, reasoning
that since the owner’s permit to operate the facility was originally time limited, the owner lacked the
investment-backed expectations necessary to support a claim.74 But, beyond this, the Courts of
Appeals have said essentially nothing about how to determine when the Act requires payment of
compensation.75
69
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What explains this small volume of litigation and the lack of appellate court guidance?
There are several plausible, overlapping explanations. The Act’s chilling effect has undoubtedly
derailed regulatory initiatives that would have produced litigation if they had been implemented.
The numerous unanswered questions about the Act may make potential claimants reluctant to invest
the time and money to litigate claims. The Act’s provision awarding attorneys fees and costs to a
prevailing party may have created an additional disincentive for litigation. The Florida courts also
may be reluctant to grapple with the challenge of developing a new statutory doctrine of regulatory
takings that is vaguely related to the constitutional doctrine yet different and more protective of
property rights. Finally, the Florida courts, which probably have some institutional commitment to
the established constitutional takings standard,76 may be reluctant to acknowledge how dramatically
the legislature has transformed property rights protection in Florida.
An ironic, unfortunate and no doubt unintended consequence of the lack of judicial
engagement with the Act is that it has increased the burden the Act imposes on the state and local
governments. As one commentator has observed, “The level of uncertainty about the meaning of
the Act leaves a wide playing field for litigants to advance an interpretation that favors them. ” 77
This uncertainty has increased the litigation risks to governments facing claims, which in turn has
increased the Act’s chilling effect, the topic to which we now turn.
The Regulatory Chill. In the absence of significant litigation, the primary effect of the Act
has been to discourage governments from adopting new regulatory restrictions. There are two
kinds of evidence for this chilling effect: examples of regulatory proposals that communities put
forward and later abandoned in the face of a threat that the regulation might generate Bert Harris
Act claims, and direct assertions by public officials that such a chilling effect exists.
For example, one Florida city reportedly hired a consultant to prepare a historic preservation
ordinance but decided against adopting the ordinance upon advice from the City Attorney that it
would likely expose the city to suit under the Bert Harris Act.78 Similarly, Palm Beach County
abandoned plans to reduce the permitted intensity of development in a 20,500-acre agricultural
reserve east of the Everglades based on legal advice that the additional restrictions could trigger
claims under the Act.79 In another example, Fort Lauderdale proposed to rewrite its zoning code to
create transitional zones between residential and commercial areas but, according to a former
76

In one leading Florida takings case, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla.
1981), the Florida Supreme Court rejected a taking claim based on a development order that
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planner for the City, “With Bert Harris, we just aborted that. ” 80 It is likely that these examples are
representative of a broader pattern, but absent a systematic survey it is impossible to know the full
extent of the chilling effect.
Various public statements by local officials and government attorneys also support the
conclusion that the chilling effect is real. Tim Jones, Deputy Assistant County Attorney for Lee
County acknowledged that the Bert Harris Act “sometimes affects the way public officials in Lee
County and elsewhere make zoning decisions. ” 81 He explained that “[e]lected officials have been
reluctant to pass laws that could expose them someday to the Bert Harris Act. ” 82 Similarly, George
Forbes, Jacksonville Beach City Manager, stated that the Act “has a chilling effect because
government officials are afraid the city will be liable to the property owners who can claim that a
denial of their permit will reduce their property’s fair market value and entitle them to
compensation. ” 83 David Dermer, the Mayor of Miami Beach, said that “Commissioners have used
the Harris Act as an excuse to shy away from zoning changes,” 84 and that threats of “[m]illions
and millions of dollars have been used as a hammer by the development community” to obtain
approval of development projects.85 In the same vein, David Jordan, Deputy General Counsel for
Florida’s Department of Community Affairs, stated “I think the chilling effect has been the major
impact” of the Bert Harris Act and that “Governments have been wary of the law so they have
tended not to make any changes. ” 86 Again, absent a statewide survey it is difficult to know how
widespread this sentiment is. But these public statements certainly suggest a common viewpoint on
the issue among government attorneys and other officials.
Developers and their attorneys essentially view the Bert Harris Act in the same light. Chuck
Mitchell, a Tallahassee developer, observed that the Bert Harris Act gave developers “a mechanism
to get government’s attention. ” 87 He stated that the Bert Harris Act was “all he needed” to get one
development project approved.88 Threats of Bert Harris Act claims have become a regular part of
the real estate business in Florida.89 Developers’ attorneys describe how they routinely raise the
80
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specter of Bert Harris Act liability when speaking with government officials about land use issues.
One attorney reported that he had threatened to assert Bert Harris Act claims “hundreds of
times. ” 90
This evidence, albeit anecdotal, suggests that the primary effect of the Bert Harris Act has
been to stop governments, particularly at the local level, from adopting new laws and regulations that
they likely would have adopted in the Act’s absence. The ultimate effect has been to undermine the
capacity of Florida’s democratic institutions to respond to the will of the public, and to reduce the
protections for land and other natural resources that Floridians would otherwise enjoy. While
Florida has experienced torrid growth for many decades, the Act made it more difficult for the
public to manage growth and mitigate its consequences.
Regulatory Roll Backs. The other major effect of the Bert Harris Act has been to force
communities to rescind or relax regulations in the face of specific Bert Harris Act claims or threats
of such claims. Thus, even when communities have been able to overcome the Act’s chilling effect
and adopt new regulations, they have often been forced to roll back the restrictions after the fact.
Some examples include:
•

In June 2007, the Fort Lauderdale City Commission granted a historic designation
to Stranahan House, a century-old house built by city pioneers Frank and Ivy
Stranahan. A few months later, the City’s Historic Preservation Board relied on the
designation to deny a certificate of appropriateness for a planned 38-unit
condominium project on an adjacent property. The developer responded by
demanding $120 million in compensation under the Bert Harris Act and on other
grounds. Attorneys for the developer publicly stated that the claim was not a threat
but rather a “reminder of consequences,” 91 and fliers were mailed to city residents
depicting a gambler’s roulette wheel and reading: “The city of Fort Lauderdale
can’t risk a $120 million bet. ” 92 On appeal, the City Commission voted 3 to 2 to
overturn the Historic Preservation Board, relying on advice from the City Attorney
that rejecting the development application would have “serious negative

company had planned to lease its site to the retailer, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Oct. 11, 2006
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consequences for the city, primarily in the form of monetary damages. ” 93 The
developer has announced: “When completed, Icon Las Olas is planned to reach a
height of 455 feet, taller than any other projects completed in the downtown area,
making it the tallest building in Fort Lauderdale. ” 94
•

The voters of the City of West Palm Beach adopted a referendum decreasing the
maximum permitted building height in the city from 15 stories to 5 stories,
prompting the filing of several Bert Harris Act claims. One developer, in
anticipation of the new height restrictions, filed an application to develop two 15story buildings and a 6-story parking garage. After the referendum was enacted, the
City denied the application. The developer filed suit, and the Circuit Court ruled that
the City was liable, rejecting the City’s argument that the voters’ approval of the
referendum could not be ascribed to the City. The City settled the case, permitting
the developer to construct the two 15-story buildings, although the developer agreed
to abandon the proposed 6-story parking garage.95

•

In a long-running dispute involving the Portofino project on the southern tip of
Miami Beach, the owner sued the City under the Bert Harris Act for $15 million
after the City down-zoned the property, reducing the permitted square footage of
development. The City eventually settled, permitting development of the property
with a square footage almost 40% in excess of what the zoning regulation allowed.96

•

In 2004, voters in Jacksonville Beach adopted a referendum imposing a 35-foot
height cap on oceanfront development. Southern Waterview, a developer that
planned to build a 10-story oceanfront condominium, filed a $38 million Bert Harris
Act claim, asserting that the new regulation interfered with its vested right to proceed
with the project, based on the fact that it had filed its building plans with the City on
November 1, 2004, a few days before the election. Following the advice of the City
Attorney that the developer had a potentially meritorious Bert Harris Act claim, the
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City allowed the developer to proceed with the project in violation of the new height
cap.97
•

In 2003, Citrus County eliminated mixed-use coastal zoning in a portion of the
community in favor of low density residential development. A developer, W.W.
Carthur, Jr., filed a $730,000 Bert Harris Act claim, and the City settled the claim by
allowing the construction of a 50-unit waterfront subdivision with 35 boat docks. In
addition to being contrary to the amended zoning regulation, the development
violated the County’s land use plan because it was within 5 miles of a nuclear power
plant.98

•

In Martin County, a developer filed a $1.6 million Bert Harris Act claim based on
wetlands regulations, and the County settled the dispute by allowing the developer to
construct 150 luxury homes on the property, together with 155 boat docks and a 54slip commercial marina.99

•

In Collier County, after the County denied a developer permission to construct a
111-acre golf course and resort within 35 feet of an active bald eagle nest site, the
developer filed a claim under the Bert Harris Act demanding $285 million in
compensation. The County eventually settled by allowing the development to
proceed in exchange for several commitments from the developer, including an
agreement to construct an artificial tree, located offsite, designed to attract the eagles.
County Commissioner Frank Halas was quoted as saying he “didn’t want to make
a deal, but feared that the county could lose the lawsuit. ” 100

•

In Bartow, after the City Council denied an application for a variance to construct a
272-acre housing development, the developer filed a $9.34 million Bert Harris Act
claim. The City Attorney advised the City that it faced potential liability under the
Act on the ground that the proposed development was consistent with the City’s
comprehensive plan. Based on this advice, a 3-2 majority of the City Council
approved a modified version of the project allowing the housing development to
proceed. One of the commissioners objected that by approving the development the
City “set[] a preceden[t] that we are going to let the developers rule with threats of
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exceed the building height limit, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 3, 2007.
98
Jorge Sanchez, Housing project suit ends with deal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006;
Catherine E. Choichet, County: Not So Fast on Lawsuit Settlement, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 9,
2005; Catherine E. Choichet, Commissioner Rues Vote on Suit, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8,
2005.
99
Homsey, Land Use Planning Impacts, 37 URB. LAW. at 289.
100
Andrea Stetson, Developer buys condo rights near eagle nest; Collier is paid $6 million,
NEWS-PRESS, Sept. 1, 2006.
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Texas
In 1995, after extensive debate, the Texas legislature passed and then Governor
George W. Bush signed into law the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act.a The
legislation is both complex and relatively limited in scope, which probably explains why
property owners have rarely invoked the Act and why legal claims based on the Act have
seldom if ever succeeded. Indeed, over the thirteen years since it was adopted, there has
been no reported court decision granting compensation or other relief under the Act. It is
less clear, especially in light of the pro-property rights culture in Texas, what if any chilling
effect the Act may be having.
The Act defines a “taking ” as a government action that is “the producing cause of
a reduction of at least 25 percent in the market value of the affected property. ” b But, as a
result of several large carve outs, the Act generally does not apply to actions by
municipalities,c and also exempts actions “reasonably taken ” to comply with federal or
state legal mandates.d The Act also includes the familiar exemptions for regulations
addressing nuisances and threats to public health and safety, as well as a hodge-podge of
other exemptions relating to, for example, oil and gas development, hunting and fishing,
floodplains, groundwater, land subsidence, and taxation.e
In a variation on the usual pay or waive formulation, the default remedy under the
Act is an injunction barring enforcement of the regulation.f However, the government
defendant has the option of paying the “damages as compensation” and keeping the
offending regulation in place.g In an odd twist, because the Act’s definition of government
actions giving rise to a taking is not restricted to actions limiting the use of property, a
persuasive case can be made that the Act applies to government authorization of
development activity that reduces the value of neighboring properties by 25% or more.h
The Act also requires governmental entities to prepare “Takings Impact
Assessments” (TIA) prior to undertaking an action that “may result in a taking ” within the
meaning of the Act.i A private property owner affected by a governmental action that should
have been, but was not analyzed in a TIA, can sue to invalidate the government action.j

TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2007.001-2007.045.
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii). Property under the Act means private “real
property recognized by common law, including a groundwater or surface water right of any
kind. ” Id. at § 2007.002(4).
c
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b)(1). The Act applies to a municipal action only in the
case of an action “that has effect in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality,
excusing annexation, and that enacts or enforces an ordinance, rule, regulation, or plan that
does not impose identical requirements or restrictions in the entire extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the municipality. ” Id. at § 2007.003(a)(3).
d
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b)(4).
e
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.003(b).
f
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.024(a).
g
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.024(c).
h
Cf. Wilkinson v. Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board, 54 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001) (affirming, on procedural grounds, dismissal of homeowners’ claims under
the Act alleging that the value of their property was reduced by a runway expansion project).
i
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.043.
j
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.044.
a

b
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In the handful of reported cases involving alleged takings under the Act, the claims
have been dismissed for lack of standing,k on the ground that the government action was
“reasonably taken” to comply with state law,l and on other, narrow procedural grounds.m
In another instance the Court of Appeals of Texas, reversing the trial court’s rejection of a
taking claim on a motion for summary judgment, ruled that there were disputed issues of
fact concerning whether the government action was covered by one of the Act’s
exemptions.n There is no record of a final, definitive ruling that either invalidates a
government action or awards compensation under the Act.
In the other reported cases under the Act, the courts rejected claims that agencies
violated the Act by not preparing TIAs.o One analysis conducted by the Texas Comptroller
the year after the Act was passed concluded that four of the 131 state agencies that the
Comptroller surveyed prepared TIAs.p There is no database of the number of TIAs
prepared since, but our research indicates that, at a minimum, state agencies have recognized
that the Act requires the preparation of TIAs and generally prepare them as required.q

k

Chambers County v. TSP Development, Ltd., 63 S.W.3d 835, 837-38, 840 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (developer with option contract for real property did not possess a property interest
sufficient to support standing to sue under the Act).
l
McMillan v Northwest Harris County Mun. Util. Dist. No. 24, 988 S.W.2d 337, 340
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (levy of delinquent standby fees by utility district not a taking under
the Act because “the levy was an action of a political subdivision that was reasonably taken
to fulfill an obligation mandated by state law”).
m
Wilkinson, 54 S.W.3d at 18 (rejecting the argument that trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for the government when the plaintiff ostensibly withdrew the taking
claim, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to provide legal support for the appeal point).
n
South West Property Trust, Inc. v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist. No. 1, 136
S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating and remanding judgment for flood control
district because there were disputed issues as to whether a tax was mandated by state law).
o
Bragg v Edwards Aquifer Authority, 71 S.W.3d 729, 737 (Tex. 2002) (State agency’s
adoption of well-permitting rules did not require the preparation of TIA because the action
fell within Act’s exemption for actions taken to “prevent waste or to protect the rights of
owners of interest in groundwater. ”); Duncan v. Calhoun County Navigation District, 28
S.W.3d. 707, 711-12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (TIA requirement did not apply to government
decision about whether to exercise eminent domain, because eminent domain is expressly
exempted from the Act).
p
See Marcilynn A. Burke, Much Ado About Nothing: Kelo v. City of New London, Babbitt
v. Sweet Home, and Other Tales from the Supreme Court, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 680
(2006) (citing John Sharp, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Report on the Private
Real Property Preservation Act, (Senate Bill 14) 1, 6 (1997)).
q
See, e.g., TEX. ADMIN. CODE Title 4, Part 1, Chapter 1(A), Rule § 1.41, available at
<http://secure.sos.state.tx.us/pls/pub/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=
&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=4&pt=1&ch=1&rl=41> (for an example of an
agency’s TIA regulation); Texas Association of Counties, Exemption from takings law
requires immediate, COUNTY ISSUES, Apr. 1997, available at
<http://www.county.org/resources/library/cissue/LN/vol7no12/Record714216.html>
(discussing costs imposed on Harris County by the TIA requirement); Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality, Proposed Regulations Chapter 290 - Public Drinking Water
Rule Project No. 2006-045-290-PR, at 115-117, available at
<http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/legal/rules/rule_lib/proposals/06045290_pro_clea
n.pdf> (for an example of a TIA).
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lawsuits,” and that the City would “be intimidated with threats of lawsuits if we do
not approve zoning or whatever it is they want. ” 101 Disappointed with this aboutface, a citizen group called the “Enough Already Committee” mounted a
referendum petition to overturn the City Council’s action and subsequently sued the
City for failing to respond to the group’s petition. As of April 2008, the litigation
was still pending.102
While these appear to be the most significant examples in which developers used the Bert
Harris Act to force communities to roll back regulations, this list is by no means exhaustive. Yet
just this handful of cases, many of which were covered extensively in local newspapers,
undoubtedly sent a powerful message to communities considering adopting new regulations and
reinforced the Act’s chilling effect.
The Dispute Resolution Act. There is comparatively little evidence about the effects of the
Dispute Resolution Act, largely because the Act is designed to encourage informal resolution of
property owners’ complaints about regulatory burdens and does not create judicially enforceable
legal rights. Nonetheless, our examination of the experience of Hillsborough County suggests that
the Act significantly benefits developers at the expense of the broader community. Twenty three
Dispute Resolution Act claims have been filed with the County since the Act’s adoption. In twelve
of these cases, or more than 50%, the County reversed its initial rejection of the development
application and approved the project in some modified form. Even discounting for the probability
that claimants who pursued this process were relatively likely to have sympathetic cases, these data
suggest that the Dispute Resolution Act provides a significant avenue for obtaining regulatory
relief. One county official described citizens’ common frustration and surprise when they learned,
after the completion of the normal regulatory review process, that the Dispute Resolution Act
granted developers a one-sided opportunity to take another bite at the proverbial apple.103
101

Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Memorandum of Law at Exhibit C: Minutes, Bartow City
Commission, Regular Meeting, Monday, Nov. 5, 2007, Pfeiffer v. City of Bartow (Fla. 10th Jud.
Cir. Ct.).
102
Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow faces key vote on project, LEDGER, Sept. 2, 2007; Metro,
Commission OKs controversial development, LEDGER, Sept. 5, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Legal
Threat Comes From New Direction: Approval of Large Housing Development Brings Challenge
From Projects Neighbor: Bartow Commission, LEDGER, Sept. 6, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow
Residents Launch Petition Drive; They Want to Force A Referendum on the Proposed Wind
Meadows Project, LEDGER, Sept. 16, 2007; Suzie Schottelkotte, Bartow residents get a voice in
lawsuit over housing development, LEDGER, Oct. 28, 2007.
103
Interview with Paula Harvey, Director, Hillsborough County Planning & Zoning Division, in
Tampa, Florida, Feb. 20, 2008. The Dispute Resolution Act has generated even less reported case
law than the Bert Harris Act, and it has been largely procedural in nature. See Peninsular Prop.
Braden River, LLC v. City of Bradenton, 965 So.2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to the Act’s provision tolling the jurisdictional time limit for filing judicial
challenges to agency administrative orders); Hanna v. Environmental Protection Commission, 735
So.2d 544 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a letter accompanied by a scientist’s field report
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What Comes Next?
The politics of land use in Florida bring to mind the image of two locomotives on a single
track racing toward a collision. One locomotive is the Bert Harris Act, which appears to be gaining
considerable momentum after 13 years as communities settle claims for millions of dollars or, much
more commonly, forego adopting new regulations or abandon newly adopted regulations. In some
quarters, political support for the property rights agenda remains strong; virtually every year bills
are introduced in the Florida legislature to clarify and strengthen the Bert Harris Act.104 Despite the
Act’s chilling effect on government’s capacity to regulate, so far there has been little if any public
discussion about limiting the scope of the Act.
The other locomotive is the Florida Hometown Democracy movement, a grassroots effort to
promote greater citizen participation in and control over the land use regulatory process.105 The
supporters of Hometown Democracy propose to place a constitutional amendment on the 2010
state ballot that would require voter approval for any change to a local government’s comprehensive
plan.106 The driving force behind this effort is the perception that the public has been excluded
from meaningful participation in the development review process and that close collaboration
between developers and local officials has produced pro-developer land use decisions.107
According to the Hometown Democracy website: “Citizens in a community have rights, too. We
have the right to demand that our ‘quality of life’ not be harmed by endless construction. . . . Our
elected officials take an oath to protect the public interest. But too many county and city
commissioners just cannot say no to comprehensive plan amendments that are destructive to a
community’s well being. ” 108
The property rights legislation and the Hometown Democracy movement are on a collision
course in the sense that Hometown Democracy is partly a reaction to the fall out from the property
indicating that parcel might contain wetlands was not a development order triggering the Act’s
dispute resolution process); Scott v. Polk County, 793 So.2d 85 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin special master proceeding under the Act).
104
See Trevarthen, Advising the Client, 78-AUG. FLA. BAR J. at 64. In the 2008 legislative session,
one bill would have redefined the regulations subject to the inordinate burden standard to include
development moratoria, reduced the waiting period before claimants could go to court, and clarified
that the enactment (as opposed to the application) of a new law or regulation does not trigger the
limitations period for filing claims. H.B. 881 (2008). This amendment failed to pass.
105
Florida Hometown Democracy, About Us, at http://www.floridahometown
democracy.com/about.html.
106
Florida Hometown Democracy, Petition, at http://www.floridahometowndemocracy.
com/documents/FHD_Petition2-Final.pdf. See also Dan Dewitt, Decision on Development Worth
Revisiting, ST PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008.
107
Patrick Slevin, No: Let’s update meeting Protocol and heal trust in local government, TC
PALM, July 24, 2007, at http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2007/jul/24/con-florida-hometowndemocracys-citizen-initiative/.
108
Florida Hometown Democracy, About Us, at http://www.floridahometowndemocracy.
com/about.html.
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rights legislation. The basic purpose of the property rights legislation was to give developers more
leverage in their dealings with government officials while limiting public involvement in the
resolution of the claims. Viewed in historical context, the Hometown Democracy movement
appears to represent an understandable and not entirely unreasonable grassroots reaction to the
success of the property rights movement in Florida.
A more specific risk of a conflict arises from the fact that local communities sometimes have
to adopt comprehensive plan amendments to implement settlements of claims under the Bert Harris
or Dispute Resolution Acts.109 Under the Hometown Democracy proposal, voters could veto these
amendments, with the result that governments threatened with expensive claims might find
themselves blocked from making settlements. Hometown Democracy, piled on top of the property
rights legislation, threatens to produce a massive, and massively expensive, regulatory gridlock.
The Florida property rights legislation is plainly one of the root causes of the citizen
frustration driving the Hometown Democracy movement. Rather than pursue an agenda that
threatens the state with gridlock, supporters of the Hometown Democracy agenda, as well as those
sympathetic to the concerns driving this movement, might consider addressing the frustrations with
Florida’s land use policies more directly by seeking the reform, if not the repeal, of the property
rights legislation itself.

109

See FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3194(1)(a) ( “After a comprehensive plan, or element or portion
thereof, has been adopted in conformity with this act, all development undertaken by, and all actions
taken in regard to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land covered by such
plan or element shall be consistent with such plan or element as adopted. ”).
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III.

Oregon Property Rights Legislation
Introduction
On November 2, 2004, Oregon voters, by a margin of 61% to 39%, adopted Measure 37, a

ballot title that read, “Government must pay owners or forgo enforcement, when certain land use
restrictions reduce property value. ” 110 The measure revolutionized property rights and the land use
regulatory process in Oregon and unleashed a heated public debate about the takings issue,
culminating three years later in another successful ballot measure (Measure 49) that substantially
narrowed Measure 37.
The contest over Measure 37 was in large part a battle over the consequences and future
viability of Oregon’s well-known land use program. Created under the leadership of Governor
Tom McCall in the 1970’s, the program established a Department of Land Conservation and
Development (DLCD), led by a Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC).111
The LCDC was charged with establishing a set of state land use policy goals, which included a
mandate for extensive public involvement in the land use program,112 a requirement that local
governments establish urban growth boundaries “[t]o provide for an orderly and efficient transition
from rural to urban land use,” 113 and policies for the preservation of millions of acres of forest and
agricultural lands for commercial farm and timber production.114 Local communities are required to
prepare and regularly update local plans and regulations to conform to the state goals, a process
overseen by the DLCD.115 In 1979, the legislature established a three-member Land Use Board of
110

Oregon Office of the Sec’y of State, Certified Ballot Title for Measure 37 (Apr. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/irr/2004/036cbt.pdf; Oregon Sec’y of State, General
Election Abstract of Votes on State Measure No. 37 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at
http//www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov2204/abstract/m37.pdf. In 2000, Oregon voters adopted
Measure 7, a similar measure amending the Oregon Constitution, which was struck down by the
Oregon Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the “single subject ” rule. See McPherson v.
Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006).
111
Carl Abbott & Deborah Howe, The Politics of Land Use Law in Oregon: Senate Bill 100,
Twenty Years After, 94 OR. HIST. Q. 5 (1993); Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of
Oregon Symposium Marking the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of SB 100, 77 OR. L. REV. 813 (1999).
112
Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 1: Citizen Involvement, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state.
or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal1.pdf.
113
Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 14: Urbanization, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/
docs/goals/goal14.pdf.
114
Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 3: Agricultural Lands, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/
LCD/docs/goals/goal3.pdf; Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 4: Forest
Lands, codified at OR. ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal4.pdf. See also OR. REV. ST. § 197.180; OR. REV.
ST. § 195.020.
115
Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, Goal 2: Land Use Planning, codified at OR.
ADMIN. CODE § 660-015-0000, available at http://www.lcd.
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Appeals to hear appeals from local land use disputes.116 Generally speaking, in comparison with
Florida’s land use program, the Oregon program is more prescriptive about what land uses are
permitted where.
The Oregon land use program has been both very popular within the state and a source of
continuous public controversy.117 Several ballot measures have been presented to the voters to
dilute the program, producing hard fought political contests, but none was ultimately successful.118
The Oregon legislature has repeatedly debated the program and from time to time adopted
amendments that have modestly weakened the original vision of Governor McCall and his allies and
also made the program a good deal more complex and confusing to the public.119 Nonetheless, the
basic structure of the program adopted in the 1970s remains in place today.
The campaign on behalf of Measure 37 was led by Oregonians in Action (OIA), an effective
property rights organization founded in large measure to counter-balance 1000 Friends of Oregon,
the advocacy group founded by Governor McCall to support the Oregon land use program.120 OIA
helped mount the successful takings challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of
Tigard,121 and led several vigorous campaigns to install property rights advocates on the Oregon
Supreme Court. Most significantly for present purposes, OIA is generally credited with drafting
Measure 37 and organizing the campaign leading to its adoption.122 The pro-Measure 37 campaign
reportedly raised approximately $1.2 million, which is substantially less than the $2,727,878 raised
by the no campaign,123 but nonetheless prevailed.
The basic theme of the yes campaign was “fairness,” that is, that regulatory restrictions
reduce the value of private property and therefore, as a matter of fairness, the public should either

state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal2.pdf.
116
Or. Rev. St. §§ 197.805-197.855.
117
See David Steves, A new look at land use; An Oregon task force resumes its work after a oneyear hiatus, REGISTER-GUARD, Mar. 11, 2008; Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights
Collide in Oregon, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2005; Timothy Egan, Oregon’s Property Rights
Law Kicks In, Easing Rigid Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006.
118
Michael C. Blumm, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon’s Measure 37 and Its
Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279, 282 n. 8 (2007).
119
See Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium, 77 OR. L. REV. at 814-16.
120
David S. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land Use Regulation and Ballot Measure 37: Newton’s Third
Law at Work, 36 ENVTL. L. 25, 41 (2006).
121
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
122
Dave Hunnicutt of Oregonians In Action—Stop 49 Campaign Spokesperson, at
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/10/dave-hunicutt-o.html; Oregonians
In Action File Measure 37 Compensation Claims for About $5 Million, Aug. 2007, at
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/08/oregonians-in-a.html.
123
Alan Pittman, Looming Sprawl, EUGENE WEEKLY, Jan. 25, 2007; Money in Politics Research
Action Project, Top 10 Contributors to Each Side of Measures on the November 2004 Ballot, at
http://oregonfollowthemoney.org/BallotMeasures/Post-Gen%20Top% 2010%20Contributors.pdf.
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pay “compensation” to those affected by the restrictions or forego their enforcement.124 The
public face of the campaign was Dorothy English, a 92-year-old widow who objected to restrictions
affecting a parcel she had purchased with her husband in 1953. As related in numerous
advertisements, their “dream was to someday divide the property, give some of it to [their] children
and grandchildren, and sell the remainder for [their] retirement. ” 125 These aspirations were
supposedly dashed when Multnomah County rezoned the land as commercial forest land “even
though there isn’t a commercial timber operation anywhere near [the] property. ” 126
One particular target of the yes campaign was a regulation that required owners of
agricultural land to earn $80,000 per year in revenues in two out of three years before they could
build a home on the property.127 Enacted as a control on hobby farming, the regulation was
attacked as a pointless restriction on agricultural operators, such as vintners, whose vines take many
years to produce salable grapes,128 and an unfair burden on retirees and other small-scale
operators.129 Proponents of Measure 37 publicized an anecdote involving Eugene and Barbara
Prete, who bought 20 acres in Oregon in 1990, planning to use the property for a retirement
home.130 When they decided to retire, they were unable to build a home on the property due to the
farm-income restriction.131 More generally, the yes campaign challenged restrictions on building
individual homes on agricultural and forest lands as unnecessary, unfair, and unduly
burdensome.132
124

Oregon Official 2004 General Election Online Voters’ Guide, Measure 37, Arguments in
Favor, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/
guide/eas/m37_bt.html.
125
Dorothy English, Measure 37, Argument in Favor, available at:
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_fav.html.
126
Id.
127
See Laura Oppenheimer, Breaking Ground Land Owners Who Fought For Measure 37 Ready
the First Cases, OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2004.
128
Cf. Gov. Victor Atiyeh, Gov. Barbara Roberts, & John D. Gray, MEASURE 37 REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEN. FLOYD J. PROZANSKI, JR., REP. GREGORY H. MACPHERSON, CO-CHAIRS
JOINT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAND USE FAIRNESS, 2007 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 19 (Mar. 21, 2007)
(recommending modification of the $80,000 per year income rule as applied to wineries and fruit
orchards).
129
See, e.g., Randal O’Toole, THE FOLLY OF SMART GROWTH, REGULATION 21 (Cato Fall 2001);
Eric Pryne, Voters in Oregon spoke loudly, but what were they trying to say?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr.
11, 2005; Laura Oppenheimer, Initiative Reprises Land Battle, OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 2004; Dave
Hunnicutt, Local Opinion, REGISTER-GUARD, Oct. 14, 2007.
130
Barbara and Eugene Prete, Measure 37, Argument in Favor, available at:
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_fav.html.
131
Laura Oppenheimer, Initiative Reprises Land Battle, OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 2004.
132
See Bill Moshofsky, Regulatory Taking Compensation—The Successful Oregon Measure 37
Initiative, Speech from the Ninth Annual National Conference on Private Property Rights, Property
Rights Foundation of America, Inc., (2005), at
http://prfamerica.org/speeches/9th/RegulatoryTakingCompensation.html; Eric Pryne, Voters in
Oregon spoke loudly, but what were they trying to say?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 11, 2005.
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The opposition campaign failed to develop a powerful public message or to galvanize the
land use program’s supporters. 133 The campaign’s lead message was that the measure would
create “layers and layers of new government processes and procedures, ” and make it “more
difficult for new farmers to enter the farming business. ” 134 This anti-government theme apparently
reinforced, rather than countered, the basic message of Measure 37 advocates. The no campaign
also emphasized the potential costs of the measure to taxpayers, and the likelihood that the measure
would generate a great deal of litigation.135 These arguments proved inadequate to overcome the
yes campaign’s appeal to fairness.
The opposition campaign decided not to argue that the measure would undermine Oregon’s
land use protections, apparently because of a concern that voters would view the argument as
implausible. The no campaign also decided against identifying the special interests backing the
measure, in particular timber companies, based on the ultimately mistaken hope that some major
timber companies whose resource base is protected by the land use system would publicly oppose
Measure 37.136 Thus, the no campaign arguably omitted one of its strongest potential arguments.
In reality, business interests “were the driving force behind the measure” 137 and were its main
beneficiaries. Timber companies, developers, and other businesses provided more than half of the
funding for the yes campaign.138 The role of these special interests in the campaign was essentially
ignored, leaving Dorothy English and other sympathetic individuals as Measure 37’s public
advocates.139
Factors other than the strengths and weaknesses of the campaigns for and against Measure
37 also help explain its adoption. Most current Oregon residents did not participate in the political
battle over the adoption of the Oregon land use program,140 and some citizens arguably took for
granted the benefits of the program. Governor Ted Kulongoski was quoted as saying that he was
133

See Blumm, Enacting Libertarian Property Values, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. at 306-307.
Measure 37, Arguments in Opposition, available at
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_opp.html>.
135
Measure 37, Arguments in Opposition, available at
<http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_opp.html>.
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See Blaine Harden, Oregon Rethinks Easing Land-Use Limits, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11,
2007.
137
To activist, measure 37 a bait and switch, OREGONIAN, Apr. 25, 2007; Robert Emmons, Speak
out to Protect Our Land, REGISTER-GUARD, May 17, 2007.
138
Measure 37 Campaign Donors With Measure 37 Claims, at
http://www.measure37watch.com/oregon_measure_37/2007/09/measure-37-do-1.html; Money in
Politics Research Action Project, Donors Who Gave More than Half the Money to the Measure 37
Campaign File Over $600 million in Claims, Could Earn Windfall on Campaign Investment, Apr.
19, 2007, at http://democracyreform.org/?q=041707release; David Sale, Measure 37 campaign
donors stand to profit from claims, NEWBERG GRAPHIC, May 2, 2007.
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See Takings Initiatives Project, Ad Wars 2004, at http://www.takingsinitiatives.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&itemid=54.
140
1.5 million Oregonians (an over 70% increase in population) moved to the state after the
comprehensive land-use statute was enacted. Census, Oregon Population Growth 1960-2000.
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“not surprised [Measure 37] passed. Most Oregon voters don’t understand how land-use rules
affect their everyday lives, giving the pro-37 camp the upper hand in the debate. ” 141 Media
coverage of the ballot contest and the potential consequences if Measure 37 were adopted was
anemic. The Oregonian, the State’s leading newspaper, went so far, after the election, to publish an
editorial by its public editor expressing regret that the newspaper had given only “limited coverage
of the measure. ” 142 Finally, Measure 37 may not have been a priority for voters, who apparently
focused their attention on other, more controversial 2004 ballot measures addressing the use of
marijuana for medical purposes and gay marriage.143
The adoption of Measure 37 unleashed a flood of claims against the state and local
governments, extensive litigation, a renewed debate about the merits of Measure 37, and an intense
policy discussion about how to deal with the unanticipated (or at least unpublicized) problems
created by Measure 37. Eventually, the state legislature adopted a comprehensive set of
amendments to Measure 37, which were approved by the state’s voters on November 6, 2007. In a
nutshell, these amendments rescinded Measure 37 as to existing laws, and in exchange granted
those who had filed claims under Measure 37 the opportunity to build up to three additional houses
(and in some instances up to ten additional houses) on protected lands. As to laws and regulations
adopted in the future, Measure 49 left Measure 37 in place but significantly narrowed its scope.
Measure 37
This section provides a sketch and analysis of the key provisions of Measure 37. Because
the measure was drafted by a small group of property rights advocates, and does not reflect the tug
and pull of legislative politics, it was relatively succinct as well as extreme.
Measure 37 mandated that government (state agencies and/or units of local or regional
government) pay “just compensation” when it enacts or enforces a regulatory restriction that
“reduce[s] the fair market value of [real] property, or any interest therein. ” 144 The measure
identified no threshold level of impact for making a claim. However, the measure allowed
government entities to avoid liability by “modify[ing],” remov[ing], or not apply[ing] ” the
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challenged regulation within a limited period after the filing of a claim.145 The popular shorthand
description of Measure 37 was that it imposed a “pay or waive” mandate.
Measure 37 was expansively retroactive. Claimants eligible to challenge pre-existing
regulations included owners who purchased property before the offending regulation was adopted,
as well as owners who obtained property from a family member who acquired the property prior to
the regulation’s adoption. In practice, this meant that thousands of land owners were entitled to file
claims based on Oregon’s comprehensive land use laws of the 1970s.
If the government elected to pay, the “just compensation” was required to “be equal to the
reduction in the fair market value of the affected property interest resulting from enactment or
enforcement of the land use regulation as of the date the owner ma[de] written demand for
compensation. ” 146 While Measure 37 resulted in virtually no payments, the issue of how to
calculate compensation under the measure was a matter of heated debate.147 Compensation could
be paid from funds “specifically allocated” for that purpose, or from other “available funds. ” 148
If the government was unable or unwilling to pay, “the governing body responsible for
enacting the land use regulation” was authorized to “modify, remove, or not to apply the land use
regulation . . . to allow the owner to use the property for a use permitted at the time the owner
acquired the property. ” 149 On its face, this waiver authority could only affect regulations adopted
while the current owner held the property, in contrast to a payment of compensation, which could
reach regulations adopted during an ancestor’s tenure.
The measure included five exemptions from the pay or waive mandate, including regulations
that (1) restricted “activities commonly and historically recognized as public nuisances under
common law; ” (2) regulated “activities for the protection of public health and safety, such as fire
and building codes, health and sanitation regulations, solid or hazardous waste regulations, and
pollution control regulations; ” (3) were necessary “to comply with federal law; ” (4) restricted
“the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography or performing nude dancing;” or (as
discussed above) (5) were enacted before the claimant, or a family member, acquired the
property.150
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To initiate a claim, a land owner was required to submit a “written demand” to the
responsible government entity or entities, but there was no prescribed set of data or supporting
documentation that had to be filed with the claim.151 The measure permitted state or local
governments to adopt “procedures for the processing of claims,” but compliance with the
procedures was not made a prerequisite for filing a claim and a claim could not be rejected for
failure to follow the procedures.152 In addition, the measure stated that “A decision by a governing
body under this act shall not be considered a land use decision as defined in ORS 197.015(10),” 153
making clear that government actions under Measure 37 were not subject to administrative review
before the Land Use Board of Appeals.154 The measure included a soft two-year deadline for the
filing of facial claims based on regulations in place on the date of adoption of Measure 37, after
which claims based on such regulations could only be brought on an as applied basis.155
The Consequences of Measure 37
Our basic conclusion is that Measure 37, if it had remained in place, would have essentially
destroyed the Oregon land use program and, over time, encouraged a sprawling development pattern
similar to that afflicting many other states. While the measure imposed a chill on new regulatory
initiatives, as in Florida, the far more important consequence was the threatened unraveling of
decades-old regulations limiting development outside of designated urban growth boundaries and
protecting productive agricultural and forest lands.
Claims Data. As of November 2007, when Measure 49 was enacted and the filing of new
claims under Measure 37 ceased, property owners had filed 7,717 claims affecting approximately
800,000 acres and demanding compensation totaling approximately $20 billion.156
The large volume of claims filed under Oregon Measure 37 stands in dramatic contrast to
the much smaller number of claims filed in Florida (and other states with takings legislation). The
primary reason for the relatively large number of claims in Oregon was the retroactive nature of
Measure 37, which created a large universe of land owners immediately eligible to file claims. In
addition, Measure 37 imposed no filing requirements other than that the claims be in writing;
claimants were not even required to submit an appraisal with their claims. Thus, a simple one-page
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document demanding millions of dollars commonly sufficed to initiate the Measure 37 process.
Finally, as hundreds and then thousands of land owners filed claims, many of which were reported
in the local media, other eligible claimants apparently decided to join “the crowd,” swelling the total
number of claims.
The majority of claims filed under Measure 37 involved residential development,157 but only
a fraction of these claims were proposals to build single-family homes that were the focus of the
public campaign on behalf of Measure 37. One authoritative analysis of Measure 37 claims
prepared for the Oregon legislature, which addressed claims involving residential projects, estimated
that 40% of the residential claims involved proposals to build between one to three homes, 31% of
the claims involved proposals to build four to nine residences, and 28% of the claims involved
subdivisions of over ten lots. 158 The claims involving larger subdivisions were disproportionately
important in terms of area, covering 71% of the total acreage affected by Measure 37 residential
claims.159 Thus, focusing on the residential claims alone, the primary beneficiaries were land
developers rather than individuals seeking a home for themselves and their families.
500,000 acres of farmland were targeted with claims involving residential subdivisions and
other development.160 The majority of the Measure 37 claims were filed in the Willamette Valley,
Oregon’s richest agricultural area,161 and the majority of these were on land zoned for agricultural
use.162 In Washington County, located in the Willamette Valley, Measure 37 claims were filed on
20% of the county’s 121,719 acres of farmland.163
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Many of the most controversial claims involved non-residential development, including
billboards,164 casinos,165 tourist centers and recreational vehicle parks,166 strip-malls and shopping
centers,167 industrial parks,168 hotels,169 golf courses,170 marinas,171 mines,172 and power plants.173
Measure 37 claims seeking compensation or waivers for billboards (including one proposal to erect
54 billboards in Portland alone174 ) were especially controversial given Oregon’s longstanding ban
on billboards.175 Another notorious Measure 37 claimant proposed to construct a one million
square-foot mega-mall in the middle of protected farm land.176
Many of the largest Measure 37 claims, both in terms of acres involved and the amount of
compensation demanded, were filed by timber companies. For example, Plum Creek filed a claim
seeking waivers of regulations that would have allowed it to pursue residential development of
32,000 acres located along the Pacific Coast in Lincoln and Coos counties, or, in the alternative,
demanding $94.8 million in compensation.177 Stimson Lumber Company filed claims seeking
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compensation of approximately $269 million on over 47,384 acres of land178 and SDS Lumber
Company filed claims seeking over $120 million on 1,465 acres of forestland in Hood River.179
Implementation of Measure 37. On its face, Measure 37 raised numerous questions about
how it should be interpreted and applied. Some of the most important questions included who was
eligible to file claims for compensation, how compensation was supposed to be calculated, what
governmental entity was responsible for paying compensation, what governmental entity had
authority to waive a regulatory restriction, whether land owners could transfer their rights under
Measure 37 to purchasers of their land, whether land owners with valid Measure rights still had to
comply with building codes and other health and safety regulations, and the scope of the various
exemptions to the pay or waive mandate.180 Several of these issues were the subject of ongoing
litigation when Measure 49 was adopted.181
All told, Measure 37 claimants filed at least 300 lawsuits against the state and local
governments.182 Neighbors also filed lawsuits challenging the issuance of waivers by the state or
local governments.183 In several instances cities sued counties over their approval of Measure 37
claims.184 The volume of controversy was even greater at the administrative level; neighboring land
owners wrote over 85,000 letters to the state registering objections or other comments on over two
thirds of the claims filed with the state.185
A handful of local governments, including Eugene, Portland, and Wilsonville, responded to
Measure 37 by passing ordinances authorizing neighbors whose land was affected by a claim
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approved under Measure 37 to sue the owner of the subject property.186 While apparently no
successful suits were filed under these ordinances, they provide a taste of the conflict engendered
by Measure 37. Not surprisingly, some critics began to call Measure 37 the “Hate Your Neighbor
Act.” 187
Notwithstanding the numerous questions and controversies raised by Measure 37, it was
apparent from the first that Measure 37 created a powerful new legal tool for land owners who
objected to regulatory restrictions. So long as it was clear that the offending regulation was adopted
after the claimant or an ancestor purchased the property, the owner generally was entitled either to
some level of compensation or to waiver of the regulation. In a handful of instances, state and local
governments refused to waive restrictions on the development of steep slopes and floodplain
regulations, invoking the exemption for regulations designed to protect “public health and
safety. ” 188 In addition, a Circuit Court judge ruled that land use regulations in the Columbia River
Gorge National Scenic Area were protected from Measure 37 claims by the exemption for
regulations “necessary to comply with federal law.” 189 Apart from these exceptional cases,
however, filing a successful Measure 37 claim was generally equivalent to the proverbial shooting
of fish in a barrel.
Endless Waivers. Measure 37 appeared, on the surface, to offer the possibility of keeping
existing regulations in place while paying compensation to those affected by the regulations.
Indeed, immediately after the adoption of Measure 37, Governor Ted Kulongoski publicly insisted
that regulations would not be waived and that some mechanism would be found to pay the
186
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Louisiana and Mississippi
In 1995, at the height of the property rights movement in the United States, Louisiana and
Mississippi adopted takings measures narrowly designed to provide a compensation remedy for owners
of agricultural and forest lands subject to regulatory restrictions. Neither piece of legislation appears to
have had any impact.
The Louisiana property rights legislation grants owners of agricultural or forest lands a right of
action against state agencies or local governments based on government actions “that cause[] a
diminution in value of a parcel of private agricultural [or forest] property. ” a The Act defines a
“diminution in value” as “an existent reduction of twenty percent or more of the fair market value or the
economically viable use of, as determined by a qualified appraisal expert, the affected portion of any
parcel of private agricultural property or the property rights thereto for agricultural purposes, as a
consequence of any regulation, rule, policy, or guideline promulgated for or by any governmental
entity. ” b When regulations diminish the value of agricultural or forest lands according to the definition
set forth in the Act, the owner is entitled to compensation.c The government may “rescind or repeal ” the
rule, but the government would remain liable for “damages sustained by the property owner to his
affected property which were caused by the application of the rescinded or repealed rule or regulation,”
including attorneys fees and costs.d The legislation includes several broad exemptions, including for state
statutory requirements and actions taken to comply with federal laws or regulations.e Like the Texas
property rights legislation, the Louisiana legislation requires the government to “prepare a written
assessment of any proposed governmental action prior to taking any proposed action that will likely result
in a diminution in value of . . . property. ” f However, the legislation creates no right of action making this
requirement enforceable in court. No lawsuits seeking compensation for the diminution in value of
property have apparently been filed under the Act, perhaps because there has been no push in Louisiana
for state or local legislation that would significantly restrict the uses of agricultural lands.
The Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Act also creates a takings remedy narrowly focused on
restrictions on the use of land for forestry or agricultural activities. The Act provides a right of action for
a government measure that “prohibits or severely limits the right of an owner to conduct forestry or
agricultural activities. ” g The Act in turn defines “prohibits or severely limits” to mean “to reduce the
value the fair market value of forest or agricultural land (or any part or parcel thereof) . . . by more than
forty percent (40%) of their value before the action.” h The government is authorized to “repeal ” or
rescind the offending regulation, and if it does so before a final judicial decision, the claimant is entitled to
“to recover its damages arising out of the action before the repeal,” as well as its attorneys fees and
certain costs, at the discretion of the court.i On the other hand, an attempted repeal after a final judicial
decision “shall not entitle the state to refuse payment, obtain a return of payment (if made) or result in
ownership in the property by the state (absent a taking of one hundred percent (100%) of the property).” j
The Act includes a relatively lengthy list of exemptions, including for regulations designed to “prohibit
activities that are noxious in fact or are harmful to the public health and safety,” fish and game laws, and
orders that are “issued as a result of a violation of state law.k Again, there are no reports of actual
litigation under this legislation, in part because of its very narrow scope, and probably in part for the same
reasons there has been no litigation involving the Louisiana legislation.
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
i
j
k

38

LA. REV. ST. § 3:3610; LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3623(C).
LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11).
LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3610(D), (F); LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3623(C)-(E); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(11).
LA. REV. ST. § 3:3610(F); LA. REV. ST. §§ 3:3623(D)-(E).
LA. REV. ST. § 3:3602(12); LA. REV. ST. § 3:3622(3).
LA. REV. ST. § 3:3609; LA. REV. ST. § 3622.1.
MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(e); MISS. CODE § 49-33-9(1).
MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(h).
MISS. CODE §§ 49-33-9(2)-(3).
MISS. CODE § 49-33-9(2).
MISS. CODE § 49-33-7(e).

claims.190 In practice, however, in all but one of the cases in which land owners filed valid Measure
37 claims, the government responded by waiving the regulations. There is apparently no
authoritative record of the exact number of Measure 37 waivers issued, but they were undoubtedly
in the thousands.191
What accounts for this remarkably uniform response to Measure 37, which apparently no
one in the debate over Measure 37 predicted? The basic explanation is that the state and local
governments lacked the funds to pay the claims.192 Measure 37 provided no dedicated funding to
pay claims. Moreover, valid Measure 37 claims, like constitutional regulatory takings judgments,
were generally understood to be uninsured and uninsurable. As a result, government officials
would have been forced to spend extremely limited general funds from agency or local government
budgets, or seek special legislative appropriations, to cover claims. For financially strapped Oregon
governments, waivers were not merely the path of least resistance, but a practical necessity.
The daunting fiscal challenge of paying Measure 37 claims was compounded by the large
volume of claims. Even assuming it were possible for a local government to pay one or a few
claims, it could not pay the dozens of similar claims that could potentially be filed. From the local
government perspective, a decision to pay a single claim likely would have generated many more
claims for compensation. In addition, paying in one or a few cases would have raised the daunting
policy and political challenge of deciding who deserved payment and who deserved a waiver. A
uniform policy of waivers avoided opening this Pandora’s Box.
Finally, the waiver option was appealing to local governments because it avoided the
technical complexities of attempting to calculate appropriate compensation. There was substantial
debate about whether a compensation award should be calculated using the traditional method in
constitutional takings cases, based on the value of the land “with” and “without” the regulation, or
using some other method.193 In addition, Measure 37 did not require a claimant to provide an
appraisal with the claim, placing the burden of preparing the appraisal on the government.
Furthermore, government officials had only 180 days to conduct their analysis and decide whether
190
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to pay compensation or waive the regulation.194 Because of all these factors, state and local
governments had ample encouragement to avoid paying and simply issue a waiver instead.
The lone case in which a local government paid compensation rather than waive the
regulation helps to illustrate why compensation was so rare. In October 2006, the Commissioners
of Prineville, Oregon, voted to pay Grover and Edith Palin $48,000 in response to their Measure 37
claim demanding either compensation or a waiver permitting them to build a home on two acres of
their property. Jerry Gillham, the assistant city manager, said of the offer “We don’t want to see
rooflines on our rim rock. ” 195 The Palins had purchased 15.7 acres on the edge of the rim rock
overlooking the City and the Crooked River Valley in 1963.196 While the City’s offer essentially
matched the Palins’ compensation demand, they rejected the offer and filed a new Measure 37
claim encompassing their entire ownership and seeking $1.5 million in compensation or permission
to build a diner and a hotel or condominiums on the property.197 Mr. Palin was quoted as stating,
“Edith and I wanted a retirement home; we didn’t get it, so now if we don’t get that we might as
well see how much money we can get. . . . I’m looking at pretty close to $5 million. ” 198 The
Palins’ strategy of upping the ante was partly successful, because the City ultimately paid the Palins
$180,000 to prevent the proposed development.199 City council members who approved the
payment believed they were “bowing to public sentiment when they declined permission for the
Palins to build their home. ” 200
Several unusual factors made the City willing to pay to resolve this claim. The proposed
development on the rim rock edge seriously threatened the scenic beauty of the community and
generated vocal public opposition. In addition, most of the land on the rim rock was already
publicly owned, meaning that paying the Palins did not expose the City to the risk of numerous
similar claims. The one-of-a-kind nature of this claim distinguished it from the thousands of other
Measure 37 claims.
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Granting a Measure 37 waiver was not the equivalent of issuing a building permit, and
various obstacles still confronted owners who sought to proceed with development on the basis of a
waiver. A Measure 37 waiver only applied to the specific regulation that was the subject of the
claim. In some cases other, pre-existing regulations restricted or at least placed conditions on
development of the property.201 Rules and regulations concerning water supply and sanitation,
regardless of when they were adopted, were generally viewed as exempt from Measure 37 based on
the “health and safety” exemption.202 In addition, some development projects required access to
infrastructure, and Measure 37 imposed no affirmative obligation on governments to make public
facilities and services available to claimants.203 For all of these reasons, apparently only a few
hundred claims, at most, were converted into actual developments or vested development rights by
the time Measure 37 was superseded by Measure 49. There is no central database of vested claims,
however, and therefore the full extent of the development authorized under Measure 37 will only
become clear as individual owners seek to establish legal entitlements to develop their properties.204
While the primary consequence of Measure 37 was a roll back of pre-existing regulatory
standards, Measure 37 also had a chilling effect on any significant new regulatory initiatives.205 In
general, the chilling effect was less pronounced, or at least less visible, than in Florida, probably
because Oregon had a more fully developed land use regulatory regime. Nonetheless, it is apparent
201

See, e.g., Umatilla County Board of Commissioners, Meeting Minutes, Hearing on Measure 37
Claim, #M37-043-06: Bert L. & Barbara A. McCormack (May 3, 2007), available at
http://www.co.umatilla.or.us/deptwebs/planning/bcc minutes/07may03. brd.m37.htm (ruling that
owners were entitled to waiver of 160-acre minimum lot size requirement but were still subject to
pre-existing 80-acre minimum lot size requirement).
202
See Peter Zuckerman, Canby man sues state, county, OREGONIAN, Dec. 6, 2007 (quoting Mike
Judd, Clackamas County’s land-use attorney, as saying “You don’t waive regulations dealing with
health and safety. . . . You have to have paved streets and sewers. You have to avoid geological
hazards. ”).
203
See, e.g., David Bates & Nicole Montesano, Big claim raises big issues, NEW-REGISTER, Sept.
10, 2005.
204
Pursuant to Measure 49, in January 2008 the state began mailing notices to Measure 37
claimants on how to proceed to establish the existence of vested rights, and claimants had 90 days
to elect how to proceed. H.B. 3540 § 8; Oregon Department of Land Conservation and
Development, Measure 49 Guide, available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/MEASURE49/docs/general/m49_guide.pdf. The state finished
mailing out notices in March 2008. Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development,
Press Release, State completes Measure 49 notice mail-out, Mar. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/news_2008.shtml#State_completes _Measure _49_notice_mail_out.
Local governments have also adopted procedures for determining whether claimants acquired vested
rights to complete and continue the use described in a waiver. See, e,g,. MARION COUNTY ORD.
1255, available at http://www.co.marion.or.us/NR/rdonlyres/E569FC78-A037-4F35-B58C637ADAA504C2/9943/M49Ord.pdf.
205
See Alan Pittmann, Unraveling Measure 37: Details could tie sprawl-threatening measures in
knots, EUGENE WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 2004 ( “Already local government attorneys are advising clients to
hold back on needed new regulations to protect livability and control sprawl for fear of Measure 37
claims. ”).

41

that Measure 37 played a role in derailing plans to enact more stringent regulations addressing
stream corridor preservation206 and historic district protection.207
Public Disenchantment with Measure 37. Virtually from the day Measure 37 was adopted
public support for the measure began to erode. Many voters apparently believed that Measure 37
would operate “as a common-sense tool that Ma and Pa could use to cut through red tape” and
“allow property owners to build homes for their children and grandchildren on their rural land. ” 208
As hundreds and then thousands of claims were filled, involving major subdivisions in rural areas
as well as mines, billboards, and large commercial developments, public sentiment about the
measure began to change. In March 2007, Governor Kulongoski said, “As every day goes by,
more and more people are saying, ‘This isn’t what we thought we were voting for.’ ” 209
Part of this shift in public attitudes about Measure 37 is attributable to the intensive media
focus on the controversies generated by the measure. Whereas only about 200 newspaper articles
published before the election even mentioned the measure and less than 80 discussed it in any
detail, almost 3000 newspaper articles about Measure 37 were published between 2004 and 2008.
While the Oregonian gave limited attention to Measure 37 in the run up to the 2004 election, the
newspaper assigned a reporter to cover the implementation of the measure on a full-time basis.210
Another explanation for the change in public attitude is that Oregonians had never swayed
in their support for the land use program. As discussed, in spite of voting for Measure 37, the
voters had previously rejected several ballot proposals that would have rolled back the land use
program. Moreover, opinion polls taken around the time of the passage of Measure 37 indicated
that Oregonians still supported the land use system.211 While the voters’ approval of Measure 37
apparently signaled a desire to address fairness issues, public attitudes about the measure shifted as
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voters came to see support for Measure 37 as inconsistent with their support for the land use
program.212
An October 2006 poll taken by the national polling firm of Greenberg Quinlin Rosner
Research revealed that voters, if given the opportunity to cast their votes again, would oppose
Measure 37 by 2-to-1, with 48% voting no, and only 29% voting yes.213 The poll also reported that
86% of voters had heard of Measure 37 and 56% of voters said they had heard a lot,214 indicating
that voters were paying attention to Measure 37’s impacts. While a plurality (48%) of all voters
believed that Measure 37 was a mistake, a significant majority (62%) of voters who had heard a lot
about Measure 37 reached the same conclusion.215 In other words, the more citizens knew about
Measure 37, the more they disliked it.
A poll taken in early 2007 by the firm of Fairbanks, Maslin, Mausllin & Associates showed
that 69% of Oregon voters thought the measure should be either repealed or amended as soon as
possible.216 While the poll revealed public sympathy for the desire of land owners to build one or a
few homes on their land, it also revealed strong opposition to commercial development or
subdivision of farm and forest lands. Another poll around the same period sponsored by 1000
Friends of Oregon showed 61% of Oregon voters in favor of either repealing or amending Measure
37.217
Measure 49
Political leaders in Oregon responded to this groundswell in favor of curbing Measure 37.
In June 2007, at the urging of Governor Kulongoski, and after prolonged negotiations, the
legislature passed House Bill 3540, a comprehensive set of amendments to Measure 37, and
referred the legislation to the voters for their approval or disapproval.218 The legislation was

212

See Peter Zuckerman, Measure 37 Maps Elicit Shock among Residents, OREGONIAN, May 17,
2007; Atiyeh, et al., MEASURE 37 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO SEN. FLOYD J. PROZANSKI,
JR., REP. GREGORY H. MACPHERSON, CO-CHAIRS at 9-13, 19-20.
213
Greenberg Quinlin Rosner Research, Voters Have Buyer’s Remorse for Measure 37 in
Oregon, available at <http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID=1816>.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Memorandum from David Metz, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates, to Opportunity PAC
II, Regarding Summary of Key Findings from Oregon Statewide Voter Survey (Mar. 16, 2007),
available at http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/docs/Key
FindingsOregonStatewideVoterSurvey.pdf.
217
Press Release, 1000 Friends of Oregon, Oregonians Change Attitudes on Measure 37 (Feb. 8,
2007), at http:// www.sightline.org/research/sprawl/res_pubs/property-fairness/m37-report-pressrelease.
218
David Steves, Senate Moves Property Rights Measure Forward, REGISTER-GUARD, June 6,
2007. The Governor’s efforts were aided by the fact that Democrats took control of both houses of
the Oregon legislature in the 2006 election. See Kirk Johnson, The 2006 Elections: The States; In
Statehouses, Too, Democrats Post Sizable Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006.

43

presented to voters as Measure 49 on November 6, 2007. It passed by a margin of 61% to 39%,
the same margin by which Measure 37 passed.219
By November 2007, Oregonians had turned strongly against Measure 37. One citizen who
had previously voted for Measure 37, but changed his mind after his neighbor filed a claim under
Measure 37 said: “We didn’t get hoodwinked this time. . . . We didn’t believe all the lies they were
trying to spread—and the numbers show it. ” 220
Unlike Measure 37, which was relatively succinct and straightforward, Measure 49, which
was the product of a protracted legislative debate, was a dense 22 pages of complex and confusing
language. It is a testament to Oregonians’ desire to be rid of Measure 37 that they voted in favor
this virtually impenetrable alternative.
Measure 49 essentially rescinded Measure 37’s pay-or-waive mandate as to existing laws
and regulations and replaced it with a relatively modest, qualified roll back of pre-Measure 37
restrictions on residential development in rural areas for those who previously filed valid Measure
37 claims. As a result, most of the 1970’s-era restrictions on development of Oregon’s rural lands,
especially high-value farm and forest lands, became effective again. As to future regulations,
Measure 49 left Measure 37 largely intact, but limited it to restrictions affecting residential
development or farm or forest practices, and modified the formula for calculating compensation for
regulatory restrictions. The most unpredictable and potentially troublesome aspect of Measure 49
is its application to future laws.
In political terms, Measure 49 represented a compromise designed to satisfy two of the
most powerful interest groups in the Measure 37 debate, 1000 Friends of Oregon and the timber
industry. The compromise served the interests of 1000 Friends of Oregon by restoring most (but
not all) of the restrictions on development of Oregon’s agricultural and forest lands. In exchange,
the leading financial backers of Measure 37, timber companies, gained significant immunity from
future regulation of forestry practices. It was also a compromise uniquely adapted to Oregon,
which already had a highly developed land use protection system and where land use advocates
were relatively more interested in reestablishing the enforceability of existing regulations than
retaining government’s long-term flexibility to adopt new regulations.
Measure 49 has several important general provisions, including language prohibiting land
owners from seeking compensation or waivers based on regulations restricting industrial or
commercial uses (such as billboards, shopping malls, or gravel pits), thereby eliminating one of the
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most controversial features of Measure 37.221 In addition, Measure 49 eliminated the prohibition
on the transferability of waivers,222 established a new formula for determining whether regulations
have reduced property values,223 and created a cause of action for neighboring land owners
adversely affected by Measure 37 decisions.224
With respect to land use restrictions in effect prior to January 1, 2007, in lieu of Measure
37’s pay or waive mandate, Measure 49 allows owners who previously filed valid claims (or had
already been granted waivers) to seek permission to construct either (1) up to three dwelling units
on land outside of urban growth boundaries, or (2) up to ten units on (a) land inside urban growth
boundaries or (b) land outside urban growth boundaries that is not high-value farmland or highvalue forestland and that is not in a ground water restricted area.225 To obtain permission to
construct up to three dwellings, the owner is required to show that a current regulation prohibits the
construction of units that were otherwise permitted at the time he acquired the property. To take
advantage of the second 10-unit option, the claimant also has to demonstrate, using the new formula
in Measure 49, that the adoption of the regulation reduced the value of the property.226
With respect to future laws and regulations, Measure 49 retains a modified version of
Measure 37. The state or local government is required to pay compensation or waive the restriction
if a regulation adopted in the future restricts residential development or farm or forest practices and
reduces private property values.227 In essence, Oregon has adopted a prospective takings measure
with respect to residential development and agricultural or forestry practices that is comparable to
those adopted in Arizona in 2004 or Florida in 1995.
As discussed, Measure 49 changed the formula for determining whether a regulation
reduces property value. In lieu of the traditional with-and-without approach used in constitutional
takings cases, Measure 49 defines a reduction in fair market value as being “equal to the decrease,
if any, in the fair market value of the property from the date that is one year before the enactment of
the land use regulation to the date that is one year after enactment, plus interest. ” 228 This
methodology applies both to claims based on new regulations and to prior Measure 37 claims
where the owner seeks to use the conditional path to obtain permission to develop up to ten
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dwellings. The new formula for calculating compensation is more defensible from an economics
perspective and is less likely to confer substantial windfalls on land owners than the original
Measure 37 formula. However, the new formula is problematic insofar as it assumes that no
individual regulation should ever reduce private property values, will likely prove very difficult to
apply in practice, and may lend itself to exaggerated claims of financial loss.229
What Comes Next?
Measure 49 decidedly represents a mixed bag. The vote on Measure 49 reflects public
rejection of the property rights agenda based on actual experience with the consequences of
Measure 37. The experience in Oregon already has and undoubtedly will continue to serve as a
cautionary lesson for other states. On the other hand, Measure 49, in its details, is a highly nuanced
and complicated political compromise. Measure 49 achieved the primary objective of Oregon land
use advocates by reestablishing most of the McCall-era land use protections for Oregon’s extensive
farm and forest lands. At the same time, as to the future, Measure 49 leaves the core of Measure 37
largely untouched. As one prominent commentator has observed, “Measure 49 retained, at least to
a large extent, the promise at the heart of Measure 37—entitling land owners to compensation for
loss of value or a regulatory waiver when a government enacts a regulation restricting residential
development, agriculture, or forestry practice—thereby curtailing governmental ability to manage
future growth. ” 230
It is difficult to predict how much of a chilling effect Measure 49 will have on future
regulatory initiatives and how state and local governments will respond to claims under Measure 49.
Oregonians, at least for the time being, have limited their ability to address future land use and
environmental challenges. Whether Oregon will learn to live with this uneasy compromise, or
eventually reject the property rights agenda not only with respect to pre-existing regulations but also
with respect to future law-making, only time will tell.
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IV.

The Lessons Learned

For several reasons, the experiences in Florida and Oregon with takings legislation were
different. The takings measures are (or were) different, the underlying regulatory programs were
different, and the historic volumes of growth and development in each state were different.
Nonetheless, our review of the experiences in Florida and Oregon (informed as well by the
experiences of other states that have adopted similar legislation) suggests five overarching
conclusions.
The Takings Agenda Undermines Community Protections
The takings agenda in Florida and Oregon undermined the public’s ability to adopt and/or
enforce regulations designed to protect homeowners, the environment, and the community as a
whole. What the takings agenda did not foster in either state was a deliberative process allowing
officials to modify or repeal regulations that imposed too great a cost relative to their benefits and to
retain valuable regulations and arrange payment of compensation to affected land owners. The
takings agenda, despite the substantial rhetoric about “compensation,” typically did not involve
making payments to anyone. Instead, it turned out to be almost exclusively about stopping
regulation.
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried famously characterized the property rights agenda:
“The grand plan was to make government pay compensation as for a taking of property
every time its regulations impinged too severely on a property right—limiting the possible
uses for a parcel of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory red tape. If the
government labored under so severe an obligation, there would be, to say the least, much
less regulation. ” 231
Fried’s perceptive description of the ultimate goal of the takings agenda appears to have
been borne out by the actual experiences in Florida and Oregon. There is substantial anecdotal
evidence from both states that the takings regime had a significant chilling effect on the enactment
of new regulations and, in Oregon, resulted in a roll back of existing regulations. The number of
times that governments paid compensation to keep regulations in place can be counted on the
fingers of one hand.
The uniform deregulatory impact of takings measures does not conform to the expectations
of either the proponents or opponents of these measures. As noted, Florida Governor Chiles
predicted that the Bert Harris Act would “safeguard[] our environmental and growth-management
protections while also offering private property owners a means to seek compensation for devalued

231

Charles Fried, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT
183 (1991).

47

land. ” 232 The Oregon League of Cities predicted that Measure 37 would produce compensation
awards totaling $3.8 billion rather than massive deregulation.233
Nor does it conform to the predictions of commentators who have argued that the takings
agenda should bring more accountability and balance to the regulatory process. For example, E.
Donald Elliott wrote that property rights legislation, by “regulating the regulators,” creates
“incentives for government to design rules more carefully and maximize the environmental benefits
of regulatory investments. ” 234 In the words of another commentator,
the presence of property rights legislation will require legislators and regulators to balance
the costs against the benefits of legislation that would affect private property. If a regulation
is determined to be sufficiently important to pay for the impact it will have on land
owners—or at least valuable and important enough to run the risk of having to pay for it—
then it is more likely to be an effective, worthwhile regulation. If the cost of a regulation is
not worth paying for, then perhaps the regulation should not be passed.235
A basic assumption underlying this viewpoint has been that a payment requirement would not
preclude regulation altogether. Rather, “[a] damages remedy gives the government a choice. It can
continue the regulation if it values it above the market price. ” 236
The reality in Florida and Oregon has been quite different, with state and local regulators
waiving, repealing, or simply not adopting all manner of land use and environmental regulations.
This effect is partly attributable to the magnitude of the claims, the lack of dedicated funding
mechanisms, and the difficulty of determining the appropriate level of compensation. It also may
reflect the understandable concern, discussed below, that paying claims might confer windfalls on
claimants who have suffered little if any reduction in the value of their properties.
But these on-the-ground results also suggest that the takings agenda is based on a
fundamental misconception about the incentives driving official behavior at the state and local levels.
As suggested by the statements quoted above, takings advocates generally treat the burdens of
compensation awards and the benefits of regulatory programs as commensurate, that is, they
assume that paying land owners has the same political significance for state and local decisionmakers as the community-wide benefits of regulation. But, based on the experience in Florida and
Oregon, state and local officials are apparently influenced far more by concerns about the impact of
compensation awards on their budgets than they are by the effects of widespread waivers on the
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general public welfare.237 The political costs of paying expensive compensation claims (and dealing
with the resulting budgetary tradeoffs) is apparently far greater than dealing with public complaints
about, say, extensive wetlands destruction, or massive traffic congestion, even if these environmental
costs are more severe, because these costs tend to be relatively diffuse in space and time. As a
result, takings compensation measures do not produce careful calculations of the relative costs and
benefits of regulatory programs. Rather, these measures operate through the backdoor to dismantle
and prevent regulation altogether.
Special Interests Benefit the Most from the Takings Agenda
While the takings agenda has commonly been portrayed as being for and on behalf of the
“little guy,” 238 the primary beneficiaries of the takings agenda in Oregon and Florida have been
well-heeled special interests.
In Oregon, the timber industry, which provided the most generous financial support to the
yes campaign, also filed the largest Measure 37 claims in terms of both acreage and the amount of
compensation demanded. Major timber industry contributors to the campaign included Seneca
Jones Timber Co. ($321,000), Dr. Johnson Lumber Company ($75,000), Stimson Lumber
Company ($30,000), Murphy Plywood ($25,000), Giustina Land & Timber Co. ($20,000), and
SDS Lumber Company ($7,500).239 All told, contributors to the yes campaign filed claims under
Measure 37 seeking payments totaling $600 million.240
While the individual seeking to build a home for himself or his family was the face of the
Measure 37 campaign, the majority of applications under Measure 37 to build residences involved
multi-unit subdivisions. In terms of acreage, subdivisions with ten or more units represented 70%
of the acreage affected by proposed residential projects.
237
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Likewise in Florida, powerful monied interests were behind the push for property rights
legislation. U.S. Sugar Corporation, a large Florida agribusiness that owns approximately 190,000
acres in Florida, provided major backing for the constitutional amendment petition that laid the
groundwork for eventual adoption of the Bert Harris Act.241 Other corporations that owned
millions of acres of undeveloped land contributed heavily to the Florida Legal Foundation, the
organization that led the drive for property rights legislation, including St. Joe Paper Company,
Lykes Brothers, and Collier Enterprises.242
Substantial anecdotal evidence, discussed above, demonstrates that large developers have
successfully exploited the Bert Harris Act to overcome regulatory obstacles and construct larger
and more environmentally intrusive developments than would have been allowed in the absence of
the legislation. In general, owners of the largest tracts of undeveloped land have benefited the most.
In both states, the takings agenda has actually undermined the rights and interests of most
property owners. Most property owners are homeowners, and they depend on community
protections to control activities that could adversely affect the value of their investments.
The Takings Agenda Creates Land Use Conflicts
Another notable lesson from the Florida and Oregon experiences is that property rights
legislation generates controversy and conflict. Measure 37 produced thousands of legal claims and
hundreds of lawsuits, and the Florida property rights legislation produced substantial but smaller
numbers of claims and lawsuits. All of this legal activity produced neighbor-neighbor conflicts
between those seeking to develop their property and those who believed they were protected from
harmful development by regulation.
One of the basic purposes of the Oregon land use program is to reduce land use conflicts
by separating sometimes inconsistent land uses, such as intensive agricultural and residential uses.
Measure 37 fundamentally undermined this policy by authorizing land owners to obtain waivers
from the state’s comprehensive land use rules. Farmers in areas traditionally devoted exclusively to
agriculture found themselves threatened, as a result of Measure 37, with potentially incompatible
residential subdivisions next door. The conflicts were exacerbated by the fact that Measure 37
authorized owners to obtain waivers based, not on logical planning principles, but on the
happenstance of when they (or an ancestor) acquired the property. As a result, Measure 37 waivers
were spread across the landscape in scattershot fashion, maximizing the neighbor-neighbor
conflicts.
There are numerous examples of the conflicts generated by Measure 37. Susie Kunzman
and other farmers in Clackamas County objected to a neighbor’s plan to open a gravel mine by
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invoking Measure 37.243 Although County Commissioners were sympathetic to the farmers, they
lacked the funds to pay compensation and were forced to waive the regulations.244 Marion County
Judge Paul Lipscomb, acting as a private citizen, sued the state and his neighbors over his
neighbors’ plan to subdivide their property, claiming that it would reduce the value of his
property.245 Farmers Bob and Crystal Vanderzanden filed a lawsuit against the state for approving
their neighbor’s plan to subdivide a 54-acre property into half-acre lots and build up to 117
homes.246 They argued the occupants of these new homes would “complain about the noise,
chemical sprays, smells and pollution generated by the agricultural operations, as well as the early
hours at which such operations commence, the late hours at which they terminate, and their
continuation throughout summer weekends. ” 247
A report prepared by the Oregon Department of Agriculture mapped the numerous
subdivisions that could be developed under Measure 37 in protected farmland, and concluded:
At least 132,346 acres of some of the best farm land in the Willamette Valley could
be impacted by development claims made under the Measure 37 property rights
initiative. That impact may also cast a shadow on adjacent existing farms by
creating compatibility issues between farmers and nearby residents. There may also
be impacts on water needed for irrigation.248
Based on another estimate, development authorized by Measure 37 could have negatively affected
90% of the farming operations in Washington County and half of the operations in Hood River
County.249
Measure 37 also generated conflict by producing “moral hazards, ” that is, by encouraging
property owners, lured by the prospect of a Measure 37 windfall, to advance more intensive
development plans then they would have in the absence of the measure. As one commentator put it,
Measure 37 “brought out the worst in people. ” 250 One striking example is the case of the Palins of
Prineville, who, in response to the community’s rejection of their application to build a home,
formulated a new plan for a more grandiose development on the property. They reasoned that the
243

Sightline Institute, TWO YEARS OF MEASURE 37 at 4-5.
Id.
245
Salem judge sues Oregon over Measure 37’s effect, CORVALLIS GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 2005; Lauren
Oppenheimer, Judge’s land-use suit adds ethics to Measure 37 saga, OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 2005.
246
Kathleen Gorman, A Measure 37 waiver prompts neighbors to sue, OREGONIAN, July 20, 2006;
Sightline Institute, TWO YEARS OF MEASURE 37 at 9-10; Second Amended Petition for Review ¶¶ 24, Bob Vanderzanden v. Land Conservation and Development Commission, No. 05C19565 (Or.
Cir. Ct.).
247
Id.
248
Oregon Department of Agriculture, WILLAMETTE VALLEY FARMLAND FACES MEASURE 37
IMPACT (Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.oregon.gov/
ODA/news/070221measure37.shtml.
249
Richmond & Houchen, MEASURE 37 at 11-13.
250
Randi Bjornstad, Campaign donors file big claims under law, REGISTER-GUARD, Sept. 3, 2006.
244

51

larger their plans, the more money they could get. In another example, a claimant sought payment
of $203 million based on an extravagant proposal to construct “a geothermal power plant, an openpit mine containing an estimated 8.5 million cubic yards of high-quality pumice, and a hundred
upscale vacation homes equipped with septic tanks and drainfields ” on 157 acres alongside a lake
in the Newberry National Volcanic Monument.251
Similarly, the Florida property rights legislation generated numerous conflicts, ranging from
the battle over Stranahan House in downtown Fort Lauderdale to the acrimonious contest over
residential development on the outer urbanizing edge of Bartow. More generally, the Florida
property rights legislation has fostered a sense of public hopelessness about government’s capacity
to control the pace and location of development, helping to spawn the Florida Hometown
Democracy movement.
Finally, some of the conflict generated by the takings measures is attributable to the legal
confusion and uncertainty surrounding the measures. According to some, one purpose of takings
measures is to improve on the sometimes confusing and often-maligned constitutional takings
doctrine; as stated by one commentator, the Bert Harris Act was intended “to bring clarity to the
admittedly muddled body of case law regarding regulatory takings. ” 252 In fact, while constitutional
takings doctrine is a matter of continuing debate, the U.S. Supreme Court has succeeded in recent
years in bringing relative stability and predictability to this area of law.253 Thus, the net effect of the
Bert Harris Act has been to generate new questions and uncertainties that will require decades to
resolve. As discussed above, the Bert Harris Act, by changing the takings standard, but
incorporating familiar terms from constitutional takings doctrine, has created an especially
confusing new set of legal rules. Oregon’s Measure 37, too, generated many new legal issues,
though arguably fewer than the Florida property rights legislation.
The Takings Agenda Confers Special Windfalls on Owners
The popularity of the takings agenda has rested on its appeal to fairness, the idea that the
public has a duty to pay compensation (or not enforce a regulation) when a restriction reduces the
value of private property. The experience gained from Florida and Oregon reveals the serious flaws
in this superficially appealing argument.
First, while certain regulations sometimes burden property owners and reduce property
values, comprehensive land use programs, such as those in Oregon and Florida, tend to support and
enhance property values. Thus, to the extent the takings agenda assumes that regulatory restrictions
generally reduce property values, the entire premise of the takings project is problematic. Second,
recognizing that regulations sometimes impose some burden on property owners, paying “just
251
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Dorothy English
Ironically, perhaps the most telling illustration of the potentially positive effect of
land use regulations, and the potential unfairness of the takings agenda, is provided by the
experience of Dorothy English, the most prominent and publicly sympathetic advocate of
Measure 37.
The real story about her property, according to news articles and available public
records, is that Mr. and Mrs. English bought a 39-acre property in 1953 for $4,500.a There
were no zoning restrictions on the property at the time of the purchase, and when
Multnomah County adopted a zoning ordinance five years later it allowed as many as 42
lots on her property.b The Englishes sold off about 11 acres of the property in 1974 for
$26,400, and then in 1977 sold off another 9 acres for $27,000. In the 1970’s, a new 20acre minimum lot size requirement was imposed under the Oregon land use program
effectively requiring them to keep the remaining 19 acres intact.c Land use planners
contended that “[s]mall-scale development on land like English’s would strain country
roads and other services,” and that the “property was zoned forestland because its soil is
suited to commercial forestry, not suburban construction. ” d County records indicated that
as of 2007, the remaining 19 acres owned by Mrs. English had a market value of $462,370,
though Mrs. English claimed that they were worth $600,000.e “In investment terms
(disregarding the earlier profits from selling off half the property), these figures translate
into a rate of return on the original investment of 9.5% and 10.1% per year. ” f
In spite of this impressive return on the family’s original investment, Mrs. English
sought permission to subdivide the remaining property into eight parcels.g Her Measure 37
claim stated that the property’s value would be $1.75 million if it could be developed in
accordance with this plan. The $1.75 million figure represents a rate of return of 12.4%.h
The County decided to issue a waiver permitting her proposed development to proceed.
Nonetheless, claiming that the County was insisting on enforcing certain other restrictions
against the property, Mrs. English sued and an Oregon county court awarded Mrs. English
$1.15 million for the value of her land, plus $438,000 in attorney fees.i This litigation has
presumably been rendered moot by the enactment of Measure 49.j
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compensation” according to the formula in the takings measures effectively grants windfalls that
are disproportionate to any injury suffered by the claimants. A compensation award under a
takings measure reflects the value of a special exemption from the rules that continue to apply to
everybody else, not the amount that would offset any actual regulatory burden suffered by the
claimant as a result of the regulation.
The evidence from Oregon demonstrates that the case for Measure 37 was based on wildly
inflated estimates of the adverse effect of land use restrictions on private property values. During
the debate preceding the 2004 vote on Measure 37, Oregonians in Action asserted that “our
planning system lowers the value of private property in Oregon by $5.4 billion a year. ” 254 But this
figure is demonstrably incorrect. Following the adoption of Measure 37, the Georgetown
Environmental Law & Policy Institute, working in collaboration with agricultural economists from
Oregon State University and the University of Minnesota, conducted an intensive empirical
investigation to determine the actual impact of the Oregon land use program on property values.255
This study found no evidence that the Oregon land use program had a systematically adverse effect
on private property values.256 These findings are consistent with many similar empirical studies
conducted elsewhere in the United States documenting that even stringent land use restrictions
commonly have little if any adverse effect on private property values.257
These empirical findings are consistent with economists’ theoretical understandings of how
land use regulations ordinarily affect private property values. 258 On the one hand, land use
regulations may have a tendency to reduce property value by restricting permitted land uses and
reducing the economic returns available from the land. On the other hand, regulations positively
affect property values by protecting amenity values in the community and minimizing conflicts with
nearby and adjacent land uses. Regulations also positively affect land values by creating a scarcity
of development opportunities, thereby increasing the value of the development opportunities that
remain. For example, zoning requirements may reduce the number of buildable lots in the
community, but each building lot is likely to be more valuable than it would be in the absence of the
program. As a matter of economic theory, it is indeterminate whether the net effect of these
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different forces will be positive or negative. A recent assessment of the economics of agricultural
zoning observed, “Economic theory does not give us a clear answer whether down zoning should
decrease or increase property values. ” 259
The second major economics problem with the takings agenda is that, even assuming
regulations sometimes impose some burden on property owners, the compensation formulas
generate monetary awards that amount to unfair windfalls. 260 The formulas call for a comparison
of the market value of an individual parcel subject to the offending regulation with the market value
of the property as if the regulation were lifted from that parcel alone.261 This with and without
approach is inherently problematic because it ignores the fact that the value of the property is
influenced not only by the restrictions limiting use of the property but also by application of the
same restrictions to neighboring properties. The formula in the takings measures effectively allows
a claimant to continue to reap the benefits of regulation of neighboring properties while demanding
relief based on the regulatory restrictions that apply to him. This calculation does not capture the
amount required to actually compensate an owner for any loss due to regulation, but instead reflects
the amount an owner would be paid if he and he alone were entitled to a special exemption from the
rules that apply to the rest of the community.
In economic theory, the correct way to measure the effect of a regulation is to ask what the
value of the property would be if the regulation had not been adopted and did not apply to anyone
in the community. While economists can perform these types of analyses using econometric
models, this complex method cannot generally be applied in individual regulatory takings cases and
it certainly has never been applied in cases arising under the Bert Harris Act or Measure 37.262
Although it is inherently misleading, the with-and-without method is straight-forward and it
is the method courts generally use in constitutional takings cases. The important difference in
constitutional takings cases is that liability is only triggered if the calculation reveals a very
substantial (generally 90% or more) reduction in property value. This high threshold effectively
259
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incorporates into the analysis the fact that regulations have both positive and negative effects on
value. Absent a very severe apparent loss in value using this approach, courts cannot conclude that
a claimant has demonstrated any serious economic loss that might justify compensation as a matter
of fairness. By contrast, under the takings measures, any adverse impact is sufficient to trigger the
need for compensation, yielding routine demands for windfall payments.
Of course, as discussed, under both the Oregon and Florida measures, claims have generally
resulted in rollbacks of the challenged regulation rather than payment of compensation. But the
economic analysis remains the same. If claimants succeed in using these measures to obtain an
exemption from rules that apply to everyone else in the community, and are permitted to develop
property in a different and more intensive way than their neighbors, they obtain an economic
windfall because the development is more valuable than it would otherwise be. Either way,
claimants receive not merely redress for any injuries they may have suffered, but a special boon at
public expense.
The Takings Agenda Undermines Local Democracy
The final lesson from Florida and Oregon is that takings measures have undermined
opportunities for the public to participate in and influence land use decision making. As discussed,
both Oregon’s and Florida’s land use programs make public participation an integral part of the
land use decision making process. The takings measures undermined the public participation goals
of both states.
While Measure 37 contained no provision mandating public involvement in the Measure 37
claims process, the measure stated that governments “may adopt or apply procedures for the
processing of claims under this act,” including procedures related to public involvement. Both the
state and many local governments adopted procedures to handle Measure 37 claims.263
Notwithstanding this formal opportunity to participate, the public’s ability to influence the
outcome was limited by a lack of substantive rights in these proceedings.264 The negative impact of
development on neighbors or the surrounding community was irrelevant under Measure 37, unless
the objection could be shoehorned into the measure’s relatively narrow exemptions for regulations
addressing “public nuisances under common law” (which the measure expressly said “shall be
construed narrowly in favor of a finding of compensation under this Act”), or “restricting or
prohibiting activities for the protection of public health and safety. ” Apart from these grounds, the
263
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public was left to object about when a regulation was adopted or when the claimant acquired the
property or, in a handful cases, whether a restriction on a particular proposed use of property
actually reduced the value of the property.265
In Florida, the Bert Harris Act’s only reference to the public is the provision stating that the
government must give written notice of the claim to contiguous owners and to parties to the
underlying administrative proceeding. However, the Act grants the public no official standing to
participate in settlement discussions under the Act, and the discussions are generally understood to
be exempt from Florida’s Government in the Sunshine Law.266 As a result, settlement discussions
under the Bert Harris Act are referred to as “shade meetings. ” 267 While the government entering
into a settlement is supposed to conclude that “the relief granted shall protect the public interest
served by the regulation at issue,” the public has no formal opportunity to submit comments on
whether this standard will be met. Similarly, the Act grants the public no formal opportunity to
participate in court proceedings to approve settlements that would contravene a statute.
In any event, in Florida the public has even fewer substantive grounds on which to object
than in Oregon. Assuming a claimant can establish a prima facie entitlement to compensation, the
public’s only significant defense is if the regulatory burdens flow from “governmental abatement,
prohibition, prevention, or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of
private property. ” 268 The entire thrust of the settlement process, subject to the general caveat that
the “public interest ” be served, is to seek some opportunity to ratchet down the regulatory
requirements, whether through “[i]ncreases . . . in the density. . . [or] intensity” of land uses,
“issuance of . . . a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief,” and so on.269
The Dispute Resolution Act provides somewhat greater opportunities for public involvement
in that Act’s mediation process. But again the entire thrust of the Act is to circumscribe the
public’s role and limit its ability to raise broader community concerns. The public has no clear
entitlement to participate in the mediation process. Even if they are allowed to participate in
265
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hearings, informal negotiations may occur outside the confines of the formal hearing and the public
has no entry point into those discussions.270 The Act makes clear that the public has no standing to
seek improvements in the underlying regulatory decision that would better protect the public
interest. Instead, members of the public can only raise objections to proposed rollbacks of
regulatory standards “which may impact their substantial interests. ” 271 Thus, the entire purpose of
the process is to address the concerns of the developer, not to consider the concerns of neighbors or
of the community. From a public advocacy perspective, the Dispute Resolution Act is a loser’s
game, and the only real question is how much the public will lose.
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